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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Adam Roberts 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of International Studies 
 
June 2016 
 
Title: The Yazidi and the Responsibility to Protect  
 
 
This thesis analyzes the international community’s response to the persecution of 
the Yazidi people by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and what implications this 
response has for the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
To answer this question, I chart and assess the major historical events that 
contributed to the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect, define the current legal 
status of the Responsibility to Protect, compare related sources of public international 
law, and investigate the relationship between the responsibility to protect doctrine and the 
Yazidi people through a case study of the persecution of the Yazidi people at the hands of 
the extremist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  
I found the international community’s response to the Yazidi crisis to be both 
inadequate and harmful to the Yazidi. Additionally, the international community’s 
response reinforced the unfavorable precedent set during the Libyan Intervention in 2011.  
 v 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Adam Roberts 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 University of Oregon School of Law, Eugene 
  
  
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Master of Arts, International Studies, 2016, University of Oregon 
 Juris Doctor, Law, 2016, University of Oregon School of Law 
 Bachelor of Arts, History, 2012, University of Oregon 
 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 International Law 
 International Human Rights 
 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
 Law Clerk, Oregon Army National Guard, 2014-Present 
  
 Legal Intern, Portland Immigration Court, Summer 2014 
  
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
 Presidential Management Fellow, 2016 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professors Anita Weiss, Michelle 
McKinley, and Ibrahim Gassama for their assistance in the preparation of this manuscript, 
and for their guidance throughout the concurrent Juris Doctor and Master Arts, 
International Studies, program. I also wish to thank Professor Susan Gary for her insight 
and advice shared with me during my undergraduate studies.  
 vii 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this manuscript to my parents Christopher and Lori Roberts and my sister 
Anna Roberts. Thank you for your unconditional love and support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ............................... 1 
  Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
 The Origins of the Responsibility to Protect.......................................................... 3 
      Rwandan Genocide ........................................................................................... 3 
      Overview.……. ........................................................................................... 3 
      Failure to Respond ............................................................................................ 6 
      Inaction Drove a Need ......................................................................................      7   
           Rwandan Genocide ......................................................................................      7 
           Srebrenica Genocide ....................................................................................      8 
      International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty  ..................      9 
      Major Reports ...................................................................................................    10  
           “The Responsibility to Protect” ...................................................................    10 
           Kofi Annan: “In Larger Freedom” ...............................................................    12 
           2005 World Summit Outcome Document ...................................................    13 
      Ban Ki-moon .....................................................................................................    14 
      Libya and the Responsibility to Protect ............................................................    15 
           Events Leading up to Resolution 1973 ........................................................    17 
           United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 ......................................    19 
      Critiques of the Responsibility to Protect .........................................................    21 
           Concerns from the Global South..................................................................    22 
           Other Actions Related to the Responsibility to Protect ....................................    26 
           Other United Nations Dialogues  ......................................................................    27  
 
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ............ 29 
 Current Status......................................................................................................... 29 
 Overview .......................................................................................................... 29 
 ix 
Chapter                                                                                                                         Page 
 Responsibility to Prevent, React, and Rebuild................................................. 29 
 Current Legal Status………………. ............................................................... 30 
 Responsibility to Protect the Yazidi Overview ................................................ 31 
 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND 
OTHER AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  ....................................................... 34 
      Law of War: Overview….... ..................................................................................    34 
      Legitimate Defense ................................................................................................ 35 
       Self-Defense ..................................................................................................... 35 
       Defense of Others ............................................................................................ 37 
      Genocide Convention............................................................................................. 38 
      Geneva Conventions and Protocols .......................................................................    40  
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court .................................................    41 
 Humanitarian Intervention .....................................................................................    42 
 Customary International Law ................................................................................    45 
 Regional Organization Use: African Union ...........................................................    48 
 
IV. THE YAZIDI PEOPLE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT.............    50 
 Introduction ............................................................................................................    50 
 The Yazidi ..............................................................................................................    51 
      Historical Persecution of the Yazidi.  ............................................................... 51 
      Current Persecution of the Yazidi ..................................................................... 54 
     Responsibility to Protect: Yazidi Crisis .................................................................. 62 
      Response of the International Community ....................................................... 62 
     Responsibility to Rebuild ........................................................................................ 64 
     Asylum…......... .......................................................................................................    65 
     Humanitarian Aid: A Critique of the Christian Aid Mission .................................. 68 
     Recent Events…………….........................................................................................71 
 
 x 
Chapter                                                                                                                           Page 
V. ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................. 75 
     The Potential of the Responsibility to Protect to Assist the Yazidi ........................    75 
     Development Risks Associated with Attempting to Rebuild Under the       
Responsibility to Protect .........................................................................................    77 
          Ulterior Motives .................................................................................................    77 
          Ramifications: Governmentality ........................................................................    79 
     Conclusion ..............................................................................................................    82 
 
REFERENCES CITED ................................................................................................   91 
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure Page 
 
 
1. Map of Rwanda ...................................................................................................... 5 
2. Map of Libya.......................................................................................................... 16 
3. Map of the Religious Composition in Iraq ............................................................ 55 
4. Yazidi Fleeing ........................................................................................................ 61 
5. Yazidi Movement Patterns ..................................................................................... 64 
  
  
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
THE HISTORY OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
A. Introduction 
 My interest in the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (often referred to as R2P or 
RtoP) emerged from the sense of frustration that I felt at seeing the persecution of the 
Yazidi people unfold across social media and main stream news sources without 
sufficient prevention or assistance by the international community. I wanted to know how 
it is possible that violent persecution and systematic human rights violations and abuses 
are still occurring twenty years after the Rwandan Genocide. This subject ties in with my 
academic and professional experiences.  
While working with the Portland Immigration Court, under the Department of 
Justice, I worked predominantly on asylum claims and convention against torture claims 
and it was clear that these same thresholds were being met by the Yazidi people. 
However, when I began this thesis there was still relatively limited information available 
on the Yazidi people, and knowing that documentation can play a critical role in a 
successful case, I wanted to contribute to the body of knowledge around this area in to 
potentially assistant any claims under these bodies of law by Yazidi people made in the 
United States. While participating in a United Nations Summer Study program I was 
exposed to the R2P, and the role it was designed to play in preventing severe human 
rights abuses. Drawing from these experiences I refined my question, which this thesis 
answers: how has the international community responded to the persecution of the Yazidi 
people by ISIS and what implications does this response have for R2P?  
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I will begin my thesis by analyzing and charting the major historical events from 
the last several decades that contributed to the emergence of R2P. I will then define the 
current status of R2P. Next, this thesis offers an examination of related sources of 
international law such as the law of war and the genocide convention to show how the 
Responsibility to protect Doctrine has been influence by pre-existing notions of public 
international law. In addition, it also looks at the relationship between the Responsibility 
to protect Doctrine and the Yazidi people through a case study of the persecution of the 
Yazidi people at the hands of the extremist organization known as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Given that the Doctrine is still developing, each utilization is still 
influencing the Doctrine and playing a role in establishing precedent, thus I seek to 
determine the impact that the persecution of the Yazidi people and the response from the 
international community are having on the developing Responsibility to protect Doctrine. 
By looking at this relationship between the Yazidi people and the Responsibility to 
Protect, I hope to show how the Yazidi people are influencing the Responsibility to 
Protect and how the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is impacting the Yazidi people.  
 I conclude by offering my assessment of the current status of the Doctrine and 
critical analysis of its impact on the Yazidi people, as well as provide recommendations 
for how the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine may be improved upon and potentially 
benefit the Yazidi people or future groups of peoples facing persecution.   
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B. The Origins of the Responsibility to Protect   
 1. Rwandan Genocide 
  a. Overview  
The tragic loss of life now known as the Rwandan Genocide took place between 
April and July 1994. During these four months over 800,000 people, mostly from the 
Tutsi minority group, were murdered in their houses and at checkpoints haphazardly 
placed on city streets. Many scholars point to the rise of extreme Hutu nationalism as the 
final push that tipped the country into the conditions wherein genocide was able to 
occur.1 The Hutu genocidal propaganda spread from the city of Kigali into the rural areas 
of the country largely through radio. With “staggering speed and brutality” citizens took 
up weapons against their neighbors, murdering them in cold blood.2 In response to the 
genocide, the Tutsi controlled Rwandese Patriotic Front3 launched a military offensive in 
July and seized control of the country, leading to hundreds of thousands more dying in 
the process. In the aftermath of the genocide and the subsequent military offensive, 
nearly two million refugees were displaced, creating a severe humanitarian crisis.  
 Much of the cultural tensions between the majority Hutus, minority Tutsis and 
small number of Twa arose from the European colonial administration and exploitation of 
Rwanda. Rwanda was controlled by the Germans under the name of German East Africa 
from 1894 to 1918. Rwanda was placed under the authority of Belgium after World War I 
pursuant to a League of Nations Mandate.4 During the period of Belgium’s colonial rule, 
                                                 
1  Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days of Slaughter, BBC, 2014.   
 
2 Id.  
 
3 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, Human Rights Watch, 2016.  
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the Belgians favored Tutsis over the Hutus creating a cultural tension that led to violence 
amongst the groups several times before the genocide in 1994. Ethnic tensions rooted in 
colonial policies would continue to divide the country after Rwanda gained its 
independence from Belgium in 1962.   
 In 1973 a military coup placed a Hutu, General Juvenal Habyarimana, in power. 
Habyarimana led the country and the new National Revolutionary Movement for 
Development Party for nearly twenty years with little political competition. In 1978 the 
Rwandan constitution was ratified and Habyarimana was elected as president “in 1978 
and reelected in 1983 and 1988, when he was the sole candidate.”5 Members of the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front, composed primarily of Tutsi refugees located in Uganda, 
invaded Rwanda in 1990. The conflict paused during a ceasefire which permitted 
negotiations between Habyarimana’s government and the RPF in 1992. An agreement 
calling for a transitional and Rwandese Patriotic Front inclusive government was signed 
in August 1993; viewed as unacceptable, by some Hutu extremists. Habyarimana’s plane 
was shot down on April 6, 1994, although it remains unclear whether it was committed 
by Hutu extremists, members of the RPF, or other actors. Shortly after Habyarimana’s 
death, members of the Rwandan armed forces and the Presidential Guard acted in 
coordination with Hutu militia groups, the Interahamwe (“Those Who Attack Together”) 
and the Impuzamugambi (“Those Who Have the Same Goal”).6 These governmental and 
non-governmental entities established roadblocks and began murdering both Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus. One of the first victims was Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Myers, P. Denys, The Mandate System of the League of Nations, Vol. 96, 2015.  
5Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days of Slaughter, BBC, 2014. 
 
6 Id.  
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moderate Hutu politician. An extremist Hutu political group from the Rwandan military 
would step in and fill the power vacuum. The mass killings quickly spread from the 
capital of Kigali through the rest of the country, enhanced greatly with the extremist Hutu 
propaganda played through the radio stations.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Rwanda 
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2. Failure to Respond 
 The lack of response from the international community with regard to the 
Rwandan Genocide is widely held as one of the largest failures of the international 
community in the last half of a century, and former United States President Bill Clinton 
has described the Rwandan genocide as one of his “greatest regrets” throughout the 
course of his eight years as president and stated that “had the U.S. and the world 
intervened earlier,” some 300,000 people may have not lost their lives.7 The current 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, laid the blame primarily on the 
United States government when she said “The United States government knew enough 
about the genocide early on to save lives, but passed up countless opportunities to 
intervene.”8 Ambassador Power’s statement strikes a chord with accusations towards the 
Clinton administration which claim that the United States knowingly ignored the loss of 
life in Rwanda, while knowing it amounted to genocide. One claim was that officials 
within the Clinton Administration were instructed not to describe the loss of life in 
Rwanda as genocide despite knowledge to the contrary. The administration’s position 
stood in stark contrast to that of the United Nations Secretary General, whose experts 
stated that there was no doubt that the violence was part of a “deliberate and widespread 
extermination of an ethnic group.”9 However, in an effort to sidestep any obligation to 
act, the Clinton administration drafted guidance which instructed members of the 
                                                 
7 20 Years After Rwanda Genocide Regret and Remembrance, ABC New, 2014. 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/04/20-years-after-rwanda-genocide-regret-and-remembrance/ 
 
8 Id.  
 
9World Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings Genocide, New York Times, 1994. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/10/world/officials-told-to-avoid-calling-rwanda-killings-genocide.html  
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government to state that only “acts of genocide may have occurred.”10 David Rawson, 
the United States Ambassador to Rwanda at the time, stated in an interview that “As a 
responsible Government, you don’t just go around hollering ‘genocide’, you say that acts 
of genocide may have occurred and they need to be investigated.11 Despite these 
opposing viewpoints, there were reports from the ground of what was transpiring in 
Rwanda at the time and calls for assistance were made and ignored. 
 3. Inaction Drove a Need 
  a. Rwandan Genocide  
 On April 21, 1994, two weeks into the Rwandan Genocide, that would continue 
for several months, General Remeo Dallaire requested an additional five to eight 
thousand soldiers from the United Nations Security Council to prevent the slaughter of 
Tutsis. General Dallaire was the Canadian commander of the United Nations Peace 
Keeping force in Rwanda at the time. General Dallaire informed the United Nations 
Security Council and the United States Department of State that if his request were met 
he could end the genocide. However, The United Nations Security Council refused his 
request for additional soldiers and instead reduced the size of his command from 2500 to 
270 soldiers. General Dallaire’s self-blame for the event is well documented in the 2004 
documentary “Shake hands with the Devil: The Journey of Romeo Dallaire.  
 Many are of the opinion that had General Dallaire been granted the additional 
soldiers as he requested instead of having his force reduced that he could have in fact 
prevented the genocide in Rwanda from reaching such an incredible loss of life, and 
                                                 
 
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
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possibly saved hundreds of thousands of lives. According to an article in the New Yorker, 
many believe that “a few thousand soldiers with tanks and big guns could have knocked 
out the radio, closed off Rwanda’s main roads, and shut down the genocide in one or two 
days.”12The United States government has faced additional scrutiny and criticism for not 
assisting in the shutdown of the radios which contributed greatly to the genocide. Some 
sources have stated that the United States government was the only entity with the 
capabilities of jamming the radios without even necessitating the entry of soldiers into 
Rwanda. However, the United States government has rejected these accusations.13 The 
lack of response to the Rwandan Genocide played a key role in shaping the consciousness 
of the international community in a way that would eventually allow for the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine to emerge. The Rwandan Genocide was not the only 
failure of the international community to respond to widespread human rights abuses. 
The Srebrenica Genocide also played a significant role in laying the ground for what 
would eventually bring about the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
  b. Srebrenica Genocide  
Along with the genocide in Rwanda, the Srebrenica massacre (also known as the 
Srebrenica Genocide” occurred in 1995 and resulted in the deaths of more than 8000 
Muslim Bosnians. Those murdered in the Srebrenica genocide consisted predominantly 
of boys and men. In addition to the murders of the Bosnians, approximately 30,000 
Bosnian women, children, and elderly were forcibly moved, meeting the threshold of 
ethnic cleansing. Members of the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska led at the time 
                                                 
12 After the Genocide, The New Yorker, 1995. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/12/18/after-the-
genocide 
 
13 Bystanders to Genocide, The Atlantic, 2001.  
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by General Ratko Mladic in addition to a Serbian paramilitary organization known as the 
Scorpions were the primary antagonists during the Srebrenica Genocide. Of note is the 
fact that the genocide occurred in a jurisdiction which was at the time supposedly 
controlled by the United Nations in the Drina Valley of northeastern Bosnia, designated 
as a safe area before its capture by the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska.  
The event was officially declared a genocide through a 2004 ruling by the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
upheld by the International Court of Justice in 2007. Secretary-General of the United 
Nations BanKi-Moon stated that the United Nations had “made serious errors of 
judgement, rooted in a philosophy of impartiality.”14  
As a result of this failure to act by the international community, Kofi Annan 
would later play a key role in advocating on behalf of the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine. The events of the genocide in Srebrenica, played a significant role in the 
willingness of the international community to engage in dialogue that involved the 
infringement of sovereignty in the name of preventing further instances of severe human 
rights abuses.  
 4. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was one 
form of response to the critiques of the failure of the international community to response 
to the human rights atrocities that occurred during the Rwandan Genocide, the Srebrenica 
Genocide, and elsewhere. With the support of the Canadian Government, a commission 
was founded which consisted of members from the General Assembly of the United 
                                                 
14 Secretary-General’s Message to Ceremony Marking the 10th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Massacre, 
The United Nations, 2005.  
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Nations. The primary goal of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty was to answer the following quested raised by Kofi Annan that “if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should 
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?”15 Members on the committee 
include participants from Australia, Algeria, Canada, the United States, Canada, Russia, 
Germany, South Africa, the Philippines, Switzerland, Guatemala, and India.  
 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s main 
purpose was the production of a report to seek to answer the question formally raised 
above by Kofi Annan. The commission released its report in December 2001, and thus 
the mandate of the commission was complete. However, the Government of Canada 
continued to follow upon the findings made by the commission.  
 The report made by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty delves into the long debate between the two seemingly non-compatible 
components of international law; the recognition of state sovereignty and of humanitarian 
intervention in the face of human rights atrocities.  
 5. Major Reports 
  a. “The Responsibility to Protect” 
 The major report produced by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty includes eight chapters titled “The Policy Challenge, A new Approach: 
‘The Responsibility To Protect’”, The Responsibility to Prevent, The Responsibility to 
                                                 
15 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, 2001. http://web.archive.org/web/20070731161527/http://www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca/report2-
en.asp 
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React, The Responsibility to Rebuild, The Questions of Authority, The Operational 
Dimension, and The Responsibility To Protect: The Way Forward.” 16  
 The first chapter titled “The Policy Challenge” begins by outlining the difficult 
and controversial position that humanitarian intervention rests within. “External military 
intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial both when it has 
happened-as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo-and when it has failed to happen, as in 
Rwanda. For some the new activism has been a long overdue internationalization of the 
human conscience; for others it has been an alarming breach of an international state 
order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of their territory. For 
some, again, the only real issue is ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for 
others, questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of precedent loom much 
larger.”17 This excerpt succinctly and accurately summarizes many of the different 
positions concerning the evolution of humanitarian intervention and thus R2P. On one 
hand of the moral dilemma is the reality of unconscionable acts of violence and on the 
other is the fear of misuse that could lead to further acts of violence or abuse. There is no 
easy solution to this problem, especially considering the history of intervention in the last 
two centuries alone, where much of the world was divided amongst super powers for 
systematic colonial and neo-colonial exploitation in the name of civilizing or lifting 
people of from barbarism.   
 
 
                                                 
 
16 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, 2001. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 
 
17 Id.  
12 
 
b. Kofi Annan: “In Larger Freedom”  
 One of the strongest voices on the side of preventing acts of mass violence even 
in the face of weakening sovereignty was the former Secretary General of the United 
Nations, Kofi Annan. 
Kofi Annan is a diplomat from Ghana and served as the seventh Secretary-
General of the United Nations, preceding the current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon. 
Secretary-General Annan was a recipient of the Nobel peace prize in 2001 and issued the 
Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for decision by Heads of State and 
Government in September 2005, titled “In Larger Freedom”. “In Larger Freedom” played 
a significant role in the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Mr. Annan 
later quit his position as the UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria due 
to frustration by the lack of progress the United Nations had made in the Syrian crisis.  
Mr. Annan was a strong advocate for the redefining of state sovereignty in order 
to afford individual sovereignty (or protection from human rights violations) in alignment 
with the Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations charter. It was Mr. 
Annan’s inclusion of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine as third part of his larger 
report that was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly from which many 
have interpreted a formal endorsement by the United Nations Members States of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
The report, “In Larger Freedom” was divided into four main sections: Freedom 
from Want, Freedom from Fear, Freedom to Live in Dignity, and Strengthening the 
United Nations. The third piece of his report, the Freedom to Live in Dignity, implored 
member states to solidify human rights efforts, democracy, and the rule of law within 
13 
 
their respective states. He specifically requested member states to “embrace the principle 
of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”18  
  c. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
 The 2005 United Nations World Summit included representatives from 191 
member states with a focus on “areas of development, security, human rights and reform 
of the United Nations.”19 At the event, which was one of the largest gatherings of world 
leaders in recent history, delegates made “important steps forward…[to include an] 
agreement on the responsibility to protect populations suffering from gross human rights 
violations.”20 This agreement has since been interpreted as an endorsement of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine as created by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty. However, there was a general “reluctance of both the 
Security Council and the wider United Nations membership…to discuss the 
Responsibility to Protect following the 2005 World Summit.”21 Despite the general 
reluctance towards the Doctrine in the aftermath of the 2005 world summit, the support 
of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, who some have said is “personally 
committed to the principles,”22 and a “handful of likeminded countries, activists, and 
scholars” the Responsibility to Protect became the accepted reference for both responding 
                                                 
18In Larger Freedom, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/in_larger_freedom.shtml 
 
19 The 2005 World Summit: An overview, United Nations, 2016, un.org.  
 
20  2005 World Summit Outcome Document: A Glass Half Full?, The United Nations Association of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (UNA-UK), 2016.  
 
21Bellamy, Alex J., Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm, (2011). 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/900868446?accountid=14698&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo 
 
22 Id. 
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and preventing mass atrocities up until the intervention of the United States government 
in Libya in 2011. 
 6. Ban Ki-moon  
 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, like his predecessor, Kofi 
Annan, was a strong supporter of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon issued a report in 2009 titled “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect”, further legitimizing the Doctrine. The report “Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect” proposed the three-pillar organization of the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine.  
 The 2009 report derives its mandate form sections 138, 139 and 140 of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document. Section 138 states that “Each individual State has 
the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity…we accept that responsibility and will act in accordance 
with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to 
exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early 
warning capability.”23 After supporting the Responsibility to Protect, Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon then acknowledges the sensitive balance between the state sovereignty and 
attempts from the international community to prevent human rights abuses, and believes 
that the solution lays within the solidification of R2P in order to deter misuse. 
 The report by Ban Ki-Moon supports the position that the best way to “discourage 
States or groups of States from misusing the responsibility to protect for inappropriate 
purposes would be to develop fully the United Nations strategy, standards, processes, 
                                                 
23 Id.  
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tools and practices for the responsibility to protect.” 24 Thus, it is evident that the 
secretary general saw the developing Responsibility to Protect Doctrine not only as a 
means of preventing future mass human rights abuses and atrocities but also as a way of 
minimizing territorial infringement or invasion on the basis of humanitarian grounds.  
 Secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon then goes on to clearly outline the three-pillar 
strategy as discussed earlier, which places an equal emphasis on not just reacting to a 
severe human rights abuses but also equally preventing them from occurring in the first 
place, and rebuilding in their aftermath. It was with this renewed emphasis and support 
from the United Nations Secretary General that R2P enjoyed a brief highpoint of hope 
and idealism before it was implemented by the United States led coalition in Libya in 
2011.   
7. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect  
The United States led coalition in Libya was justified by its advocates under the 
existing structure of R2P that had begun to solidify in 2005 after the United Nations 
World Summit. The action of the international community under the R2P were in 
response to allegations that the government of Libya headed by President Gaddafi had 
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity upon Libyan citizens who were 
engaging in what they described as peaceful civilian protests, and was further preparing 
to escalate such action. Gaddafi raised particular concern from many in the international 
community when labeling protesters as “cockroaches” and “rats” and urging his 
supporters to attack protesters and to “cleanse Libya house by house,” all language which 
likely resonated strongly with the language used by the Hutu power structure during the 
                                                 
 
24 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf. 
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Rwandan Genocide to compel people to commit violence upon their neighbors. This 
similarity in language, when seen from the lens of the failure to prevent the Rwandan 
Genocide played a significant role in building international support for the Libyan 
intervention under R2P in 2011. 
 
Figure 2:  Map of Libya 
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a. Events Leading up to Resolution 1973  
The Libyan civil war began as a series of political demonstrations inspired by the 
neighboring protests in Tunisia and Egypt that were motivated by allegations of 
government, ineptitude, corruption and abuse at the hands of the former Libyan 
government, controlled at the time by the authoritarian dictator Muammar Gaddafi.   
Gaddafi founded a revolutionary group within the military and led the coup d’état 
which overthrew the former King Idris who had ruled Libya as an absolute monarch 
.Gaddafi had seized power in a military coup in 1969.While seeking to connect with other 
Arab nationalist’s governments and Islamic socialist movements, Gaddafi also sought to 
expel foreign imperialist influences from Libya. Between 1969 and 1977 Gaddafi led 
Libya as the leader of the Libyan Arab Republic and then transitioned into the position 
titled “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya” of the Great Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from 1977 until 2011. In 1977 Gaddafi reformed the 
government and renamed it the Jamahiriya or “state of the masses”, a new socialist state. 
Gaddafi ruled through his military power and responded harshly to dissidents and 
political opponents through notorious policing of the Libyan people, ruthlessly 
eliminating threats to his rule until his demise in 2011. 
Gaddafi helped to instill his own interpretation of Arab Nationalism and Arab 
Socialism and was a supporter of Pan-Africanism and eventually served as the 
Chairperson of the African Union for two years, ending in 2010. Toward the end of his 
rule, Gaddafi turned away from some of his previous policies and began to support 
economic privatization and improved relations with western economic powers during the 
1990s, which coincided with his role in the African Union. He was eventually captured 
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and killed by militant members of the National Transitional Council during the 2011 civil 
war in the aftermath of the United States led coalition intervention. 
 The protest in Libya began on February 15, 2011 and gained international 
notoriety when the Gaddafi regime responded to the protest with extreme force. The 
harsh government response took the form of crowed dispersals, arrests, tear gas, and 
eventually the deadly use of small arms fire against protestors. The government rapidly 
labeled the protestors as an “armed rebellion” and responded with alarming violence.25 
Members of the international community declared that the harsh government response 
may have amounted to crimes against humanity; meanwhile the country was divided in 
zones controlled by the Gaddafi government and rebellion forces.  
 The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, 
2011, which sought to “impose immediate measures to stop the violence, ensure 
accountability and facilitate humanitarian aid”26 The measure was unanimously approved 
by members of the United Nations Security Council. Major components of Resolution 
1970 included an arms embargo to be placed upon Libya, freezing of assets of key 
members of the Gaddafi regime, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance.27 In 
addition the resolution referred the allegations of crimes against humanity to the 
International Criminal Court, and obligated the Security Council to review the situation 
as necessary. However, despite the implementation of Resolution 1970 the situation in 
Libya continued to deteriorate and the government continued to use increasingly severe 
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levels of force against larger and more militarized protestors and allegations of war 
crimes and atrocities among both parties became increasingly frequent.  
b. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 
 Resolution 1973 by the United Nations Security Council authorized action to be 
taken by the international community in order to prevent the continued harm of Libyan 
citizens by the Gaddafi government. Resolution 1973 "authorizes member states that 
have notified the secretary-general, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the secretary-general, to take all necessary 
measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya...while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any 
part of Libyan territory."28  
          Resolution 1973 adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 2011 began by 
condemning the failure of the Libyan government to adhere to the requirements of 
resolution 1970. The resolution then uses language directly aligning with R2P Doctrine 
when it states “reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the 
Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary 
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians.”29 
          This language speaks to the first pillar of the R2P Doctrine; the responsibility that a 
state has to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and ethnic cleansing.  Resolution 1973 then continues by “condemning the gross and 
systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced 
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disappearances, torture and summary executions.”30  Additionally the resolution points 
towards the “acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities 
against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and urging these 
authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as 
outlined in resolution 1738.31 The Security Council also went so far as to state that the 
“widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity32. Here the 
language shifts from urging the Libyan government to adhere to its responsibility to 
protect its own people towards suggesting that it will ensure the protection of civilians, an 
action that falls under the third pillar of the R2P, that if a state fails to protect its citizens 
from the aforementioned mass atrocities, then the international community has the 
responsibility to intervene through various measures, the last of which is military 
intervention. 
 After urging the Gaddafi regime to meet its responsibility to protect its people, the 
United Nations Security Council ordered airstrikes on March 17th, with abstentions from 
both Russia and China, in order to “ensure the protection of civilians.”33 NATO led the 
mission in Libya labeled Operation Unified Protector in an effort to implement 
Resolution 1973. This was the first complete test of R2P since its adoption in 2005 and it 
was backed explicitly by the United Security Council. The goal of preventing a massacre 
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in Benghazi was achieved shortly, and Gaddafi forces hastily retreated after their air 
defenses were destroyed. However, as the war continued and NATO continued to strike 
wider targets and according to one advocate who later became a critique of R2P, “for 
those of us who feared that R2P was just a warrant for war, our fears have been 
vindicated.”34 
  The intervention in Libya quickly resulted in a regime change and a host of 
airstrikes that resulted in numerous deaths of civilians.  Mr. Rieff of The Economist 
articulated the common opinion that Libya shows both how “a modest dose of air power 
can save lives; but also that the rhetoric of civilian protection can be stretched to justify a 
creeping mission.”35  It has now been five years since Gaddafi was overthrown and Libya 
has become a failed state. Elections have failed to bring about unity, and forces 
competing for power have seized their own areas of control as the Fajr Libya (Libya 
Dawn) forces have battled the internationally recognized government which relocated to 
Tobruk. Both sides have received support from outside countries. To further complicate 
the issue, ISIS has taken advantage of the political instability and begun to spread into the 
region. As Mr. Rieff illustrated, the invoking of the responsibility as a justification and 
the unfavorable results have largely polarized the critiques and proponents of the 
Doctrine.  
8. Critiques of the Responsibility to Protect 
 Critiques of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine are abundant and varied and 
range from political science based realist critiques to postcolonial critiques. In Jeremy 
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Moses’s critique of the R2P titled “Sovereignty as irresponsibility? A Realist critique of 
the Responsibility to Protect” published in the Review of International Studies, Moses 
offers a critical view of the idea that has developed since the 1990s of “sovereignty as 
responsibility.”36 This idea, upon which the responsibility is a crux, is a more universalist 
perspective and counters the traditional position that sovereignty allows state leaders to 
“abuse their own citizens without fear of external intervention to halt the abuse.”37 Mr. 
Moses argues that there are problems associated with this assumption and questions 
whether R2P and “sovereignty as responsibility” truly depart from the traditional views 
of sovereignty. The realist argument questions those who see sovereignty as “a variable, 
arguing that its precise meaning and behavioral implications vary from one historical 
context to another” contrasting that of the realist who views sovereignty as de facto 
power.38  
  a. Concerns from the Global South   
While proponents of R2P see the language of the Doctrine as a complete reversal 
of the language used with regard to humanitarian intervention, for example as Dr. Rama 
Mani, an international peace and security scholar from Oxford points out, R2P shifted 
away from the “right of outsiders to intervene and towards the rights of populations at 
risk to assistance and protection and the responsibility of outsiders to come to the 
rescue”, although for many this exchange of language is insufficient to separate the 
Doctrine from the previous abuses imposed upon the global south in the name of 
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humanitarianism throughout colonialism and neo-colonialism. For example the 
Nicaraguan president of the General Assembly, Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, described 
R2P as nothing more than a form of “redecorated colonialism.”39 
International affairs scholar Noam Chomsky, in “The skeleton in the closet: The 
responsibility to protect in history,” discusses the precarious relationship between the 
R2P and exploitative practices being undertaken in the name of assisting others. Mr. 
Chomsky points to Japan’s 1931 attack on Manchuria, Mussolini’s 1935 invasion of 
Ethiopia, and Hitler’s occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and highlights how each of 
these self-serving political undertakings were done in the name of protecting population 
who were said to be suffering from oppression of varying kinds. These memories, along 
with the lingering harm of systematic colonial exploitation led to the South Summit of 
133 states, which met in April 2000. At the summit, it was declared that ‘the so-called 
“right” of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations 
Charter or in the general principles of international law.’40 While the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine was in many ways a response to the dissatisfaction of the loose 
humanitarian intervention of the 1990s and early 2000s many see it as an insincere or 
superficial change and look at the R2P as neo-colonialism in a new coat.  
Post-colonial theory-based critiques point at the unequal application of 
intervention and views this unequal application as indication not as benevolence but as 
mere self-interest. Some point to the contradiction between the willingness of the United 
                                                 
39 Rama Mani and Thomas G. Weiss, Responsibility to Protect, Cultural perspectives in the global South, 
2011. 
 
40 Noam Chomsky, Skeletons in the closet, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=k206yi2PlWUC&pg=PA4&dq=responsibility+to+protect+colonialism
&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi0rLP298jMAhXBHpQKHZHPBUYQ6AEINTAE#v=onepage&q&f=fals
e 
24 
 
States to intervene in Sudan but not called for action in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. Brendan Stone of the Dominion suggests that in this particular case the 
willingness of the West to intervene in Sudan is of strategic value given its position of 
entry in the Middle East and its recent use of its oil generated funds for projects that do 
not align with the principles of the International Monetary Fund. George Bush had even 
endorsed “Save Darfur” rallies calling for humanitarian intervention. Contrarily, there has 
been relative silence with regard to the millions who have died in the Congolese civil 
wars.  
 Post-colonial critiques voices by many leaders of the global south also argue that 
R2P reinforces a system of “Western hyper-sovereignty and conditional Eastern 
sovereignty.”41  
The post-colonial critique of R2Pby Mojtaba Mahdavi titled “A Postcolonial 
Critique of Responsibility to Protect in the Middle East” problematizes the “selective, 
arbitrary and punitive implementation of international law in Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Libya 
and Syria” and suggests that the policing language of human rights is merely the 
disguised neo-liberal hegemony and a means of maintaining a paternalistic legacy. The 
author then calls for reform of the United Nations, and the empowerment of regional 
organizations and the withholding of R2P until there is first a responsibility for justice in 
the form of decolonization and democratization of the world. 
Another post-colonial criticism of R2P is that those who claim to do the 
protecting of human rights are often human rights abusers themselves. The Former 
Haitian Minister of Defence, Patrick Elie posed the questions “who is protecting the 
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rights of the people of Iraq, killed by the bombs of those who would grant themselves the 
‘responsibility to protect?” The scholar Edward Said stated that “colonialism is not just 
the occupation of territory, but it requires a state of mind as well; a state of mind which, 
includes ideas that certain people and certain territories require and beseech domination.”  
 Despite these critiques, there are still strong advocates in favor of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Gareth Evans, the former Australian Foreign Minister 
stated that “R2P is a framework for action for pragmatists, not purists, and this is very 
well understood by those who have to apply it, not just write about it.”42 
 While strong voices ring on both sides of the debate, and many seem fixed in their 
positions, there are some who are advocating for a middle approach of tweaking elements 
of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, whether it be removing outright military 
intervention or necessitating stronger monitoring capabilities.  
 Some, such as Justin Morris, the Head of the Department of Politics and 
International Studies at the University of Hull, suggest that R2P should be “reconstituted 
as a standard of acceptable sovereign behavior…while decisions over coercive military 
intervention…should be made outside of the R2P framework.”43 Others have argued for 
building upon R2P as oppose to trimming it down.  
 On the geopolitical scale, Brazil has proposed supplementing R2P with what it 
calls “responsibility while protecting” which include two key proposals: one, that a set of 
criteria be debated before the Security Council approves the use of military force, and 
two, that an improved monitoring and review process be enabled. The goal is to ensure 
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that all non-military options are fully explored, and that the response is proportional, and 
that a balance of consequences be analyzed for those suffering.  While the issue of R2P 
has become polarized, its usage has not stagnated entirely. While there hasn’t been a full-
fledged Libya like event there have been other instances of action taken in the name of 
R2P and actions that resemble R2P characteristics. Meanwhile, dialogues by the United 
Nations have continued since the intervention in Libya in 2011. One such instance will be 
assessed in greater detail in the chapter devoted to the Yazidi people.  
 9. Other Actions Related to the Responsibility to Protect  
 Other instances relating to R2P included the events in Kenya between 2007 and 
2008 where the declaration of Mwai Kibaki as president led to widespread political and 
ethnic based violence as members of the Orange Democratic Movement and Party of 
National Unity fought largely along ethnic lines. The French Foreign Minister Benard 
Kouchner asked the United Nations Security Council in January 2008 to act “in the name 
of the responsibility to protect”. Kofi Annan led a mediation effort which led to a power-
sharing agreement. Human Rights Watch declared the response “a model of diplomatic 
action under the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principles.”44 
 The language of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is also visible in the 
United Nations response to the post-election violence in the Ivory Coast between 2010 
and 2011. During this period there was a wave of post-election violence committed by 
both former President Gbagbo and President Ouattara supporters.  On March 30 2011, the 
United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1975 which stated that it is the 
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“primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians.”45 The resolution also stated 
that United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) had the right to use “all necessary 
means to protect life and property” and called for the transfer of power to President 
Ouattara.   
 In 2013, in response to the ethno religious violence within the Central African 
Republic, the African Union activated an African international support mission to the 
Central African Republic known as the African-led International Support Mission to the 
Central African Republic (MISCA).46  MISCA was unable to curtail the rising violence 
within the Central African Republic and as a result the United Nations General Assembly 
sponsored France with Resolution 2121to assist MISCA in their mission to protect 
civilians and restore security within the Central African Republic.  
 Additionally, with regard to ongoing conflict in Syria, the United States 
government attempted at various times over the past several years to invoke the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine through the United Nations Security Council. 
However, these attempts were vetoed by the Russian and Chinese representatives arguing 
that R2P had been misused by the United States government in Libya. 
 J. Other United Nations Dialogues  
 Since 2009, there have continued to be various debates and discussions amongst 
member states within the United Nations General Assembly. In 2009 there was the 
General Assembly Debate on R2P. In 2010 the United Nations General Assembly held an 
Interactive Dialogue on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect. 
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There was also the 2011 General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Role of 
Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the R2P. In 2012 The General 
Assembly held an Informal, Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely 
and Decisive Response. Finally, in 2013 The United Nations General Assembly held an 
Informal, Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and 
Prevention.  
 Additional reports were produced from several of these meeting, including the 
2010 report titled “Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect and the 
2011 report which look at The Role of Regional and Sub regional Arrangements in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.”  
 The goal of this first chapter was to provide an overview of the critical events that 
led to and shaped the emergence of R2P. I have charted the evolution of R2P, beginning 
after the International Community’s failure to respond to the Rwandan and Srebrenica 
Genocides, and continued through the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, major reports to include “The Responsibility to Protect”, “In Larger 
Freedom”, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, support from the United 
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. I have also shown how R2P was applied during 
the Libyan intervention in 2011 and discussed some critiques of R2P and other actions 
that relate to R2P. Now that I have charted the major historical events that contributed to 
the emergence of the R2P I will next define the current legal status of the R2P.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 
A. Current Status 
 1. Overview  
 The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine or norm or principle, depending on your 
point of view, is a concept rooted in international law. The Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine in its current status is divided up into three main pillars. The first pillar declares 
that States have a primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The Second pillar of R2P declares 
that the international community has a responsibility to assist a state to fulfill its first 
responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The third pillar of R2P declares that if a state fails to 
protect its citizens from the aforementioned mass atrocities, then the international 
community has the responsibility to intervene through various measures, the last of which 
is military intervention.  
 2. Responsibility to Prevent, React, and Rebuild 
 Under the current status of R2P there are three separate obligations. The first 
obligation under R2P Doctrine is the responsibility to prevent. The responsibility to 
prevent mandates that both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other 
man-made crises putting populations at risk be addressed.  
 The second obligations is the responsibility to react, necessitating response to 
situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include 
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coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases 
military intervention.  
 The third obligations is the responsibility to rebuild, which is requires full 
assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliations, addressing the causes of the 
harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert, particularly after military 
intervention.  
 3. Current Legal Status  
 The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine finds its authority through different 
existing sources of international law.  The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine explicitly 
states that nations must protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. For example in the case of genocide, states are 
required to prevent and punish genocide in accordance with the Genocide Convention.  
 The obligation to protect a state’s population from war crimes is rooted in 
international humanitarian law and laws of war.  States’ obligations to respect 
international humanitarian law are enumerated in the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols.  
 While crimes against humanity do not have their own international treaty or 
convention  explicitly states nation’s responsibilities, crimes against humanity are defined 
in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and have been recognized 
international crime. Additionally, many components of crimes against humanity have 
their own conventions, including crimes such as slavery or torture (in the Convention 
Against Torture for example).  
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 The fourth crime demanding a response under the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine is ethnic cleansing.  Ethnic cleansing is defined as “the planned deliberate 
removal from a specific territory, persons of a particular ethnic group, by force or 
intimidation, in order to render that area ethnically homogenous” by a United Nations 
Commission in 1993. Ethnic cleansing can constitute both a crime against humanity and a 
war crime.  
 The crimes denoted in the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine find their authority 
in previously existing bodies of public international law; therefore, the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine has been greatly influenced by pre-existing legal structures. The 
relationship between R2P and other sources of public international law are examined in 
greater depth in Chapter III, but first I will outline the history of the emergence of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine beginning with the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.  
4. Responsibility to Protect and the Yazidi Overview  
 The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is a relatively newly formed international 
norm in the realm of public international law, wherein sovereignty can be forfeited by 
states due to their failure to protect their citizens from crimes against humanity, ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, and war crimes.47  The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine was 
positively received by much of the international community in the mid 2000’s prior to its 
implementation in the Libyan intervention in 2011.  
The third pillar ofR2P is the aspect of the norm which draws the heaviest critiques 
as it has been compared to humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is 
widely unpopular due to its infringements on state sovereignty and given how easily it 
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has been abused in the past. The use of the third pillar of R2P by the United States led 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya in 2011 also received 
wide criticism from the international community.48 The Libyan intervention and the 
subsequent instability in the region have greatly harmed the reputation of the 
Responsibility to protect Doctrine, which was originally created as a means of reigning 
back ambiguous and less restricted humanitarian intervention. The following quote from 
the news agency Al-Jazeera highlights the distinction between the utilization of the third 
pillar in Libya by the United States in 2011 and the employment of the second pillar of 
the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in the case of the Yazidi humanitarian response.  
 “The Obama administration and its allies intervened in Libya despite Gaddafi’s 
obvious objections, while the effort in Iraq received a rubber-stamp approval from the 
central government in Baghdad.”49  
The distinction is important. The Iraqi government’s approval leaves intact what 
little sovereignty Baghdad possesses after more than a decade of civil conflict.”50 It is 
important also to note the critical view of Al-Jazeera of even the utilization of the second 
pillar of the Doctrine. Here the news agency is insinuating that the authority given by the 
Iraqi government is questionable because of the position of weakness.  I would go further 
and argue that not only was the Iraqi government in a position of weakness, but it was in 
a position of weakness directly brought about by the actions of the United States due to 
their intervention in Iraq in 2003 and subsequent occupation and withdrawal. Al-
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Jazeera’s criticism is valid although I would press further and suggest that ideally it 
should not have been a United States led coalition that intervened on behalf of the Yazidi 
people given this recent history of intervention but should instead have been another 
member of the international community. However, despite these qualms, it was in fact the 
United States who led the response to the Yazidi humanitarian crisis.  
Al-Jazeera further commented by saying “With Baghdad’s approval, the U.S. 
intervention has become a second-pillar operation under RtoP.”51 The international 
coalition for the responsibility to protect stated in agreement that the 
“assistance…measures to prevent the imminent genocide of the Yazidi population, [is] a 
clear example of upholding the second pillar of the responsibility to protect.52  
This chapter defined the current status of R2P, provided an overview of the 
responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild, defined the obligations within R2P, gave an 
overview of the legal basis of R2P, and summarized the status through which R2P was 
applied to the Yazidi people. I will next look at the relationship between R2Pand other 
Doctrines in the field of public international law.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT AND OTHER AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Law of War: Overview 
 Modern international law is influenced heavily from the “Law of War and Peace” 
written by the 17th century legal scholar Hugo Grotius in 1625.  Within the “Law of War 
and Peace” it states that there are three “just” causes of war to include, defense, the 
recovery of what’s our own, and punishment. I will examine the first of these three just 
causes to provide insight into the relationship between the international legal theory 
“defense of others”; a branch of thought off of “just” defense, and the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine.   
The international laws of war were solidified in Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter which states that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
collective or individual self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”53  Measures taken by members in exercise of this right 
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”54  
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This language from the United Nations charter explicitly recognizes rights of 
states to the legitimate use of force in self-defense. The Nicaragua case held before the 
International Court of Justice affirmed the rights of states to use force in self-defense and 
clarified to some extent what level of force is appropriate in certain situations. Further 
tests for the use of force in international law include the test Caroline test and the 
imminent threat requirement. The Caroline test derived from customary law, requires the 
presence of “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment of deliberation, and that action taken must be proportional.”55 The 
Caroline test has also been used as the basis for the much disputed and controversial 
preemptive strike or preemption Doctrine made infamous as the justification for the 
infamous invasion of Iraq by the United States government. From this foundational right 
of self-defense, the concept legitimate defense and self-defense sprung forth, which in 
turned have an important relationship with the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
B. Legitimate Defense 
1. Self-Defense 
 The idea of legitimate self-defense is rooted in natural law under the notion of 
self-preservations or in a more modern dialect the right of existence. Theorists 
specializing in natural law during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries laid the 
foundation for the use of military force to counter an attack in the name of self-
preservation. Speaking to the right of self-preservation as an inalienable aspect of natural 
law is Christian Wolff, who stated that “man is bound to preserve himself by 
nature…likewise the right of defending one’s self against the injuries of others belongs to 
                                                 
 
55 Nichols, Thomas, The Coming Age of Preventive War, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.  
36 
 
man by nature, and the law of nature itself assigns it to a nation”.  At the end Mr. Wolff is 
declaring that the same natural law principle can be extrapolated upon nation states. Mr. 
Vattel similarly stated that “The right of employing force, or making war, belongs to 
nations no farther than is necessary for their own defense, and for the maintenance of 
their rights. Now, if any one attacks a nation, or violates her perfect rights, he does her an 
injury. Then, and not till then, that nation has a right to repel the aggressor, and reduce 
him to reason. Further, she has a right to prevent the intended injury, when she sees 
herself threatened with it”. These ideas have been accepted and incorporated into the 
United Nations Charter, securing states the right of military self-defense.  
From this same source of international law, article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, comes the modern realization of the concept of legitimate defense in the 
international legal sense.  While the English translation of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter speaks of the inherent right of self-defense, individual or collective, the 
French interpretation of the charter, influenced by the civil law system speaks of the 
“droit naturel de légitime défense.” Translated into English this says “the right to natural 
and legitimate defense”.  This is critical because in civil law jurisdictions the notion of 
legitimate defense includes the allowance of the use of force to fend off attacks against 
themselves or a third party. Thus some legal scholars argue that this idea of the common 
law defense of others is rolled into international law of war. This broader civil law 
interpretation of legitimate defense and therefore the defense of others provides an 
argument which is favorable of outside intervention, when taken in order to defend 
another from violence, while defense of another nation is distinct from humanitarian 
intervention, there are common threads between legitimate defense and the 
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Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.56 There are however distinctions and qualifications 
associated with any intervention justified through the legitimate defense and the defense 
of others.  
 2. Defense of Others   
 The use of defense of others in the international legal sense, rooted in legitimate 
defense theory would, in situations where a victim is entitled to exercise the use of force 
in their self-defense allow for others to exercise the use of force on behalf of the victim. 
While this idea is generally accepted by the international legal community there is debate 
as to whether this legitimate defense of others, in the case of one state coming to the aid 
of another state that is being attacked can be read as if the there is also a legitimate 
ground for a Doctrine of humanitarian intervention incorporated into legitimate defense. 
The primary issue with this extrapolation is that a formal request for assistance is unlikely 
given that in a humanitarian emergency it is rarely the state apparatus that is asking for 
assistance but a sub national group that is being targeted from other components either 
within or outside of the state. Thus the relationship between the international legal 
concepts of legitimate defense or defense of others and the Doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is delicate, with some arguing that there is a justification for one within the 
other and some arguing that they are entirely different concepts. Those who see a strong 
connection between these concepts or perhaps a legitimate ground for a Doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention within legitimate defense would also likely encapsulate this 
relationship within the aspects of R2Pwhich incorporates humanitarian intervention, 
specifically within the responsibility to react and within the second and third pillars of the 
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Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Another major piece of public international law with 
which the responsibility shares a strong relationship is the Genocide Convention.  
B. Genocide Convention 
  1. Overview  
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide known colloquially as Genocide Convention was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on December 9th in response to the atrocities committed by 
the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people during World War 1 and against the 
Jewish people by the Nazi regime during World War II.  
 The convention came into force on 12 January 1951 and stands as one of the 
strongest examples of compulsory international human rights law. There are currently 
147 member states that have ratified the convention. Those who have ratified the 
convention are required to both act to prevent n punish acts which meet the threshold of 
genocide, whether they are carried out in times of war or peace.   
 One of the key components of the Genocide Convention is the definition of 
genocide found within Article 2 of the document. Article 2 defines the genocide 
convention as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
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Article 3 of the Genocide Convention lists the crimes that are punishable underneath it as  
 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
 The Genocide Convention also includes both preventative and repressive 
measure that must be taken with regard to a genocidal event. Article 5 of the convention 
requires that State Parties must enact “the necessary legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons 
guilty of genocide of the other acts enumerated in Article III.”57 Therefore, the actionable 
duties of a state wherein genocide is occurring include punishing or making punishable 
all perpetrators, making it possible to try alleged genocidal actors before courts within the 
State or before an international tribunal58. Article 5 while requiring “effective penalties” 
for persons found guilty of genocide does not explicitly state what satisfies the 
requirement of “effective penalties.”59  
The relationship between the Genocide Convention and the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine is clear. Genocide being the one of what is known as the “four crimes”: 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the genocide 
convention is effectively defining one of the four circumstances under which R2P rooted 
action could take place. Therefore, given that R2P is principle and not legally binding in 
its current state, it is grounded in existing pieces of international law to include the 
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Genocide Convention. As previously mentioned the four crimes of the responsibility to 
protect are also rooted in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. Next I will discuss the relationship between the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.  
D. Geneva Conventions and Protocols 
Another source of public international law that bears a strong relationship with 
R2P is the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. The Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and Additional Protocols, and their Commentaries are the binding international law 
governing international humanitarian law, also known as laws of war, and thus defining 
what types of acts constitute war crimes. The Geneva Conventions are made up of four 
treaties. The treaties were established in 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949, with additional 
updated terms being added to the first three treaties during the 1949 convention. The four 
pieces of international law are focused on “Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field”, “Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea”, “Prisoners of War”, 
and the final major convention was devoted to Civilians, brought about by the severe 
violence and mass murder perpetrated upon civilians during World War II.  
In addition to the main four treaties or conventions there also two annexes, that 
were created in 1977, one of which was amended in 1993. Accompanying the two 
annexes, the first of two Additional Protocols was also introduced in 1977, which was 
followed by a second additional protocol in 2005.  
Common Article 3 also states that rules of war are applicable to armed conflicts 
within the territory of a single member state. Applicable provision with regard to those 
not taking part in hostilities prohibit violence upon their persons, murder, mutilation, 
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cruelty, torture, the taking of hostages, humiliation and degradation among others. 
Violations of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions that meet the definition of a 
“grave breach” of international humanitarian law constitute a war crime and include 
inhumane treatment, torture, killing, biological experiments, causing great suffering or 
serious injury, forcing someone to serve in the armed forces, depriving people of a  right 
to a fair trial if that person is accused of a war crime, the taking of hostages, the unlawful 
deportation, transfer, or confinement of others, or the wanton destruction of property.   
Similar to the Genocide Convention’s relationship to R2P, one of the four crimes 
denoted under R2P, that of war crimes, is rooted in and finds its authority within the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. Another connection that must be 
addressed is the connection between the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
E. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is also where one of the 
four crimes denoted in the Responsibility to Protect is grounded. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court defines crimes against humanity as “any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:  
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
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ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any 
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” 
 There have also been additional slightly altered definitions used during the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.60 While Crimes against humanity does not have its 
own treaty, elements of the crime as listed above are included in other conventions. An 
R2P action could likely be justified under any of the criteria used in these definitions.  
F. Humanitarian Intervention 
 Humanitarian Intervention is the body upon which R2P was both built upon and 
was built in response too, and therefore the most similar piece of international law with 
regard to the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Humanitarian intervention is defined as 
the use of military force when its primary declared aim is to end human-rights violations 
in the state where the military force is being applied. The key characteristics of 
humanitarian intervention include the use of military force, interference in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state by sending military forces into the territory or airspace that 
has not committed an act of aggression against the sender, and that the intervention is in 
response to humanitarian crises. While this definition includes most of the most 
commonly understood elements of humanitarian intervention, there is no set legal 
definition or threshold to be met. Humanitarian intervention plays upon a critical tension 
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of public international law, and one that will be revisited in this examination; that of the 
struggle between sovereignty and intervention.  
 The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia upholds the right of sovereign states to act as they 
will within their own territories or borders. This source of public international law is the 
root of modern sovereignty and was incorporated into the 1945 United Nations Charter in 
article 2(7) which states that “nothing should authorize intervention in matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”61 However, this principle apparently comes 
into conflict within Chapter VII of the United Nations Charters which allows the United 
Nations Security Council to act in response to situations that constitute a “threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”  This issue becomes more contentious 
when action is taken both without the consent of the host government and importantly, 
without approval by the United Nations Security Council.  
Tony Blair stated that there is a moral right to “get actively involved in other 
people’s conflicts”. When he made this statement he was referencing one instance where 
the United Nations Security Council did not approval of military action. As a result of 
statements such as this by leaders of world superpowers and notably by the actions taken 
by groups of states or regional organizations without United Nations Security Council 
approval there have been instances of interventions being taken without authorization that 
have undermined the current international security status quo. Notable instances of 
unauthorized interventions taking place without United Nations Security Council 
approval include the United States led intervention in the aftermath of the Gulf War 
which was rationalized as a humanitarian response to the vulnerability of the Kurdish 
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people in Northern Iraq. A second and highly controversial instance of humanitarian 
intervention being utilized without United Nations Security Council approval was the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Kosovo. This intervention 
in particular is seen as having played a significant role in damaging United States and 
Russian relations in the post-soviet period.  
The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine has a controversial relationship with the 
international legal concept of humanitarian intervention. On the one hand R2P was driven 
in part by the near unilateral humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and from these, a 
need arose to attempt to codify or limit the broad means through which intervention in 
another sovereign was being justified. Despite this position from which R2P arose, the 
similarities between humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
have harmed the reputation of R2P, even in its stages of infancy. The greatest supporters 
of the Doctrine of humanitarian intervention have largely hailed from African and 
European nations while those opposed have included many South American and Asian 
nations.  
Doctrinally, there are also similarities that must be discussed. Humanitarian 
intervention as I will define as the interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state 
by sending military forces into the territory or airspace that has not committed an act of 
aggression against the sender, and that the intervention is in response to humanitarian 
crises, falls within the second pillar of the Doctrine. As discussed earlier the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is comprised of three obligations: the responsibility to 
prevent, react, and rebuild. Under the second obligation, the responsibility to react, is the 
responsibility to “respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate 
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measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international 
prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. Thus humanitarian intervention 
was repackaged as a last resort within the second pillar of R2P, and it is from the 
connection that much of the ire towards the Doctrine has manifested. 
G. Customary International Law 
According to Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
there are four sources of international law. International law can derive from international 
conventions, international custom, the general principles of law, or judicial decisions and 
teachings of highly qualified experts.62 
Customary international law is drawn from established state practice.63 This is 
significantly different than obligations from written international treaties and other 
codified sources of law. According to the ICJ Statute there are two factors necessary to 
show that customary international law can be established.64 Firstly, customary 
international law must be established by showing state practice. In order for the state 
practice requirement to be met a particular state practice must be followed regularly or 
according to United Kingdom v. Iceland be “common, consistent and concordant”. 
Effectively this means that for a particular state practice must include a substantial 
number of states and lack substantial dissent.65 The International Court of Justice has 
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65 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), note 4 at pg. 98, 27, 1986.  
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ruled in the past that a claim for customary international law was lacking because it 
lacked consistency.  
It is important to note that a state that wishes to dissent the opposition of a rule 
may do so by persistently objecting to the application of a rule.66  
State practice can be either physical or verbal. Examples of physical state 
behavior include battlefield behavior, the use of certain weapons, and the treatment of 
people. Verbal state practice includes military manuals, legislation, case law, instruction 
to military forces, diplomatic protests, opinions of legal advisers, executive decisions, 
and statements made in international organizations and at international conferences.67 In 
order for customary international law to be established the second factor of opinion juris 
must also be present. Opinio juris “denotes a subjective obligation, a sense on behalf of a 
state that it is bound to the law in question…whether the practice of a state is due to a 
belief that it is legally obliged to do a particular act is difficult to prove objectively. 
Therefore, opinion juris is an unsettled and debated notion in international law.” 68 
International customary law is relevant with regard to the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine in several regards. As stated by Peter Stockburger, a professor of 
international law at the University of San Diego School of Law “the responsibility to 
protect Doctrine is generally described in one of two ways: (1) either as an emerging 
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norm of customary international law or (2) as a new binding principles of customary 
international law. Regardless of whether you are of the opinion that R2P is an emerging 
norm or a binding principle it is clear that the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine finds 
some of its legitimacy in international customary law.  
A second more tenuous relationship between the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine and customary law concerns state behavior and the precedent being set by 
recent invocations of the Doctrine. While the four crimes that the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine is designed to protect against, find their authority in the other bodies of 
public international law discussed above, some of the aspects such as what meets the 
requirements for fulfilling the responsibility to prevent or rebuild. Another area that is not 
yet solidified is that although it states that military force must only be used under the 
responsibility to react as a last resort it does not explicitly state which actions must be 
undertaken before military force is appropriate.  Given that R2P is still relatively new and 
that it has only been used on a few occasions it is still impressionable under customary 
international law, especially in the area of state practice.  
The actions taken by the United States led coalition in Libya for example played a 
role in shaping the “common, consistent and concordant” state practice, and more 
specifically through physical state behavior on the battlefield. It is possible that future 
actions taken in the name of R2P could more easily neglect the responsibility to prevent 
and rebuild as the United States led coalition did in the Libyan intervention in 2011. R2P 
also influenced notable regional institutions such as the African Union.  
  
 
48 
 
H. Regional Organization Use: African Union 
 The African Union played a significant role in the formulation of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and has some of the strongest language with regard to 
legislation which aligns significantly with the spirit of the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine. In 2000, the African Union codified its regulations with which to organize and 
conduct itself, which took the form of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. All 53 
signatory states of the African Union have ratified the act. Within the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union, Article 4(h) speaks most directly to the themes included in the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
 Article 4(h) states that “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity”.  Thus, Article 4(h), with the exception 
of “ethnic cleansing” is nearly verbatim to the circumstances when which R2P states that 
action is required. Effectively, signatory states were voluntarily giving up their ultimate 
right to state sovereignty if these extreme circumstances were to arise in their territories. 
The right to “intervene” could likely take the form of Pillar II related international 
assistance and helping to build of the capacity of the host government to respond to the 
emergency, or pillar III of R2P, actual response from a foreign state representing the 
African Union.   
 In 2005, the African Union moved even more towards the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine with the adoption of the Ezulwini Consensus. The Ezulwini Consenus 
speaks directly to R2P and the legality of the use of force in relation to it.  The consensus 
states that the use of force should be in line with Article 51 of the United Nations charter.   
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 The chapter sought to show the relationship between R2P and other Doctrines in 
the field of public international law. I discussed the law of war, self-defense, legitimate 
defense, defense of others, the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, humanitarian 
intervention, customary international law, the use of R2P by regional organizations, and 
the relationship between these concepts and R2P. I will now examine the ongoing 
persecution of the Yazidi and its relationship with R2P.  
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CHAPTER IV  
THE YAZIDI PEOPLE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
A. Introduction 
The Yazidi people have been targeted by the extremist organization known as the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and been forced to either convert, flee, or be 
executed. ISIS has also enslaved hundreds of Yazidi women and girls, claiming them as 
wives or servants. The Yazidi people are followers of a distinct religion that combines 
aspects of Islam, Zoroastrianism, and Mithraism. The Yazidis are a predominantly 
Kurdish population, historically located in the northern region of Iraq and have faced 
persecution for their religious beliefs since the 16th century. The international community 
responded to the persecution of the Yazidis in the form of a military coalition and non-
governmental organization (NGO) led humanitarian assistance under the international 
legal authority of the still developing Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
The purpose of this paper is firstly to highlight the human rights abuses 
committed upon the Yazidi population by the extremist organization known as ISIS. 
Secondly, this essay will investigate the humanitarian response under the second pillar of 
the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine as conducted by a United States led international 
coalition. Thirdly, this essay will critique some of the means of assistance being offered 
and considered to include the granting of asylum and the deployment of humanitarian and 
aid based responses to assist the Yazidis. The goal of this chapter is to offer insight into 
the egregious human rights crisis befallen upon the Yazidi community that is still 
unfolding and show how the international community has responded, which has truly 
been imperfect.  
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B. The Yazidi 
 1. Historical Persecution of the Yazidi 
  The Yazidi people (also known as the Yezedi, or Ezidi), predominantly 
located in Iraq’s Nineveh Province have been persecuted for centuries because of their 
unique religious beliefs. Yazidism, the religion of the ethno-religious group known as the 
Yazidi people, bans marriage to non- Yazidis which has helped to foster a unique religion 
and culture, that is distinct from other neighboring societies and their associated cultures.  
Yazidism is a monotheistic religion that has ties to ancient Mesopotamian 
religions as well as components of Christianity and Islam.69 The two Yazidi holy books 
are claimed by some to be the Kiteba Cilwe (Book of Revelation) and the Mishefa Res 
(Black Book), although many scholars insist that that the manuscripts of these two books 
were forgeries written in response to interest from western scholars, as they do not align 
with Yazidi traditions.70 The Yazidi traditions are maintained primarily through hymns 
that are orally passed to newer generations and supplemented with stories to give 
context.71  
According to Yazidism, there is one god who created the world and below him 
are seven angels.72 The chief angel is known as Melek Taus and second in importance 
only to the creator. Each of the seven angels is associated with an animal73. Melek Taus 
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is affiliated with a peacock, contributing to the description of Yazidis by outsiders as 
“peacock worshippers”74.  The chief angel Melek Taus, is responsible for both the good 
and bad in the world75. In their religious story, Melek Taus angers the creator and falls 
from his grace into a fiery hell76. However, differing greatly from the other monotheistic 
traditions, Melek Taus is redeemed through his remorse, and his tears put out the fires of 
hell and he is released and welcomed back by the creator.77  
 This particular aspect of their religion-the fall of Melek Taus-is the root of much 
of the persecution that has befallen the Yazidi people. Others have drawn similarities 
between Melek Taus and Satan resulting in centuries of persecution.78 Evidence of 
persecution at the hands of the Ottomans dates back to 1640/79  In this instance, 
approximately 40,000 soldiers were sent to attack multiple Yazidi villages throughout the 
Sinjar mountain area.80 Throughout the battles over three thousand Yazidi were killed 
and another 2000 that had hidden from the violence were discovered and murdered.81 
During this same act of violence, over three hundred Yazidi villages were looted and then 
set on fire.82 A second act of violence committed by the Ottomans upon the Yazidi 
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people took place in 1892 in accordance with an order by Sultan Abdulhamid II.83 During 
this time, Sultan Abdulhamid was running a massive campaign to spread Islam 
throughout the Ottoman Empire.84 As a result, religious minorities were targeted for 
widespread conscription and in many cases were murdered outright.85 This campaign 
targeted Armenians, Christians, and Yazidis among others religious minorities.86 
 Several centuries later, the Yazidi have not escaped persecution on behalf of their 
religious beliefs. In 2007a bus was hijacked in Mosul, Iraq. The stolen bus was carrying 
Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis. After the bus was hijacked, the Muslims and Christians 
on board were allowed to leave the bus. However, the 23 Yazidis on board were not 
allowed to leave, and were then driven to a remote location and murdered.87 This incident 
shows how the violence directed towards the Yazidi people is also being carried out by 
smaller actors than the state level such as the Ottoman Empire or even ISIS for example, 
indicating that some people have internalized the messages directing ill towards the 
Yazidis.  
 Later the same year, in August 2007, the Yazidi villages of Qahtaniya and Jazeera 
were attacked by vehicle born improvised explosive devices88. Four separate vehicles 
carrying over two tons of explosives detonated in the Yazidi villages killing 
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approximately 500 people and injuring close to 150089. No entity ever claimed the attacks 
in Qahtaniya or Jazeera. However, the United States government assessed Al-Qaeda to be 
the likely culprit with the main indicator being the complexity and coordination of the 
vehicle bombings in the Yazidi villages.90 
 More recently, the Yazidi people who are recognized as a distinct ethnic group by 
the United Nations have been pressured by Kurdish authorities to identify as ethnically 
Kurdish91. This push has been predominately composed of demands for compliance in 
the Kurdish efforts to annex disputed areas in the region.92 As a result, the Yazidi people 
are stuck between those who seek to exploit them and those who are attempting to 
forcibly convert or kill them.  
2. Current Persecution of the Yazidi  
ISIS is currently carrying out what has been labeled as “ethnic cleansing” by the 
human rights organization, Amnesty International, in the northern Iraq province of 
Nineveh against various religious minorities to include the Yazidi people.93 Ethnic and 
religious minorities which have lived in the region for centuries are being threatened with 
death if they refuse to convert to the extremist group’s warped interpretation of Islam.94  
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Figure 3: Map of the Religious Composition in Iraq 
 
Ethnic cleansing is defined as the “mass expulsion or killing of members of an 
unwanted ethnic group in a society.”95 The targeted minorities include Assyrian 
Christians, Turkmen Shi’a, Shabak Shi’a, Kakai, Sabean  Mandaeans and Yazidis.96 
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While the Yazidi people are not the only minority group to be targeted by ISIS, they are 
one of the most vulnerable given the relatively small population size, with global 
estimates as low as 300,000.97 The small population size is due in part to the exclusive 
nature of the religion which only passes on to others through birth and does not accept 
converts.98 
 It is estimated that over fifty thousand Yazidis fled from the Sinjar region as ISIS 
overtook the area.99 Those who were unable to flee in time were abducted by ISIS, to 
include many women and children. Allegations of rape and sexual abuse of detained 
women and children are rampant.100 As ISIS advanced through the villages and towns in 
the Sinjar region some put up armed resistance. Those who resisted were captured and 
executed in large groups as a warning to others.101 ISIS allegedly gave the men who did 
not resist one of three choices, to give up their women, their religion, or their head. ISIS 
released footage of Yazidi men converting to Islam, no doubt in an effort to save 
themselves and their families. Many of the towns overtaken by ISIS are still occupied by 
the extremist organization leaving the Yazidi people unable to return to their homes. 
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Additionally, none who were captured, even those who converted, have been allowed to 
leave ISIS controlled territory.102 Reports have also emerged of ISIS destroying the 
religious sites of non-Muslims, further contributing to the cultural and historical 
vulnerability of the Yazidi people in the region.103 
Many of the Yazidi who successfully evaded ISIS fled into Kurdistan and parts of 
Syria. Fortunately, the majority of these minority communities escaped before ISIS 
militants took over their towns. However, those who managed to escape were only able to 
escape with what they could carry, creating a massive humanitarian emergency. Many of 
the Yazidi people who have fled into Kurdistan and Syria have arrived in refugee camps 
managed by humanitarian and aid organizations. One refugee camp known as the Newroz 
refugee, alone, has been host to approximately 15,000 Yazidi people with hundreds of 
others staying in nearby villages and towns.104  
 According to a recent Amnesty International Report, ISIS has committed violence 
upon ethnic and religious minorities, to include the Yazidi people, within Northern Iraq 
in a manner that meets the threshold of ethnic cleansing. The report states that “ISIS has 
systematically targeted non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslim communities, killing or 
abducting hundreds, possibly thousands and forcing more than 830,000 others to flee the 
areas captured since 10 June 2014”105. The report goes on to state that thousands of 
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Yazidis, predominantly women and children, were abducted in early August and are still 
being held by the Islamic State, with the exception of a few escapees.106 The few Yazidis 
who managed to escape from mass killings or imprisonment by the Islamic State have 
claimed they and others were being forced to convert to Islam, taken from their families 
to unknown locations, and sexually abused and raped.107  
 The abductions occurred after an initial advance by the Islamic state resulted in 
the death of hundreds of Yazidi men and boys from villages and towns throughout the 
Sinjar region. While many Yazidi put up armed resistance, many were “captured and shot 
in cold blood, scores in large groups, others individually, seemingly in reprisal for 
resisting and to dissuade others from doing so.”108 Once major piece of evidence that 
supports the accusations of ethnic cleansing consists of video footage of Islamic State 
fighters converting groups of Yazidi men who had been previously captured. The video 
was distributed on social media as Islamic State propaganda. A second piece of evidence 
supporting the claim that the Islamic State has committed ethnic cleansing towards the 
Yazidi people concerns the destruction of places of worship. The report claims that in a 
manner resembling previous examples of ISIS destroying ancient artifacts, the fighters 
have specifically targeted Yazidi places of worship in an attempt to erase their culture 
and history. This technique is reminiscent of the efforts undertaken by the Nazis during 
World War II to erase Jewish culture and heritage through the destruction of artwork and 
books by Jewish artists and authors.  
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 ISIS has been accused of killing minorities in the northern Iraq villages of 
Qiniyeh and Kocho and smaller villages such as Solagh resulting in the deaths of 
hundreds between August 3 and August 15. 109The atrocities committed in these villages 
are some of the most well documented pieces of evidence concerning the allegations of 
ethnic cleansing towards ISIS. Next are firsthand accounts of the killings committed by 
ISIS as described by a witness who managed to hide from the ISIS fighters as they 
attacked the village: 
A white Toyota pick-up stopped by the house of my neighbor, Salah Mrad Noura, 
who raised a white flag to indicate they were peaceful civilians. The pick-up had 
some 14 ISIS men on the back. They took out some 30 people from my 
neighbor’s house: men, women and children. They put the women and children, 
some 20 of them, on the back of another vehicle which had come, a large white 
Kia, and marched the men, about nine of them, to the nearby wadi [dry river bed]. 
There they made them kneel and shot them in the back. They were all killed; I 
watched from my hiding place for a long time and none of them moved. I know 
two of those killed: my neighbor Salah Mrad Noura, who was about 80 years old, 
and his son Kheiro, aged about 45 or 50.110 
 
In the small Yazidi village of Kocho with approximately 1200 inhabitants, ISIS 
fighters killed more than a hundred men and boys on August 15th. Those who survived 
told humanitarian organizations that members of ISIS gathered everyone they could 
capture at the village school near the edge of the village. After gathering the Yazidis they 
placed the men and some of the boys into trucks, 15-20 at a time and drove them a short 
distance before shooting them. Approximately 400 men and boys have still not been 
accounted for.111   
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In the village of Qiniyeh a group of more than 300 Yazidis from the town of Tal 
Qasab were trapped trying to escape to Mount Sinjar. ISIS fighter caught them and 
separated the men and boys from the women and young children. Close to a hundred of 
the men and boys were massacred.112 A firsthand account from a villager named Mohsen 
Elias who narrowly survived the massacre stated that:  
They split us into two groups, men and boys of 12 and older in one group and 
women and younger children in another group. They started to load the women 
and children in the vehicles and made us (men and boys) walk to the nearby wadi. 
The youngest of the group was my brother Nusrat, 12 years old. We were made to 
squat by the edge of the wadi, which was deep. They told us to convert to Islam 
and we refused. One grabbed me by my shirt from behind and pulled me up and 
tried to shoot me but his weapon did not fire. My brother Nusrat was scared and 
was crying. They opened fire from behind us. I fell into the wadi and was not 
injured. My brother Nusrat was right next to me and was killed. My father, Elias, 
and my four brothers, Faysal, Ma’amun, Sa’id and Sofian, were all killed. Most of 
the other men and boys were also killed, including more than 43 of my 
relatives.113 
 
Amnesty International also reported on a similar act of violence occurring near 
the village of Jdal.114 A group of 50-60 men accompanied with their families were shot to 
death near the Qahtanya and Sinjar crossroad. Like in the other attacks, after the men 
were killed the women and children were taken away by the ISIS fighters.  
Nearly all of the women and children who were abducted by ISIS fighters are still 
being held in captivity. However, through smuggled communications a few women have 
been able to communicate with relatives who escaped. ISIS has also released recruiting 
videos with men discussing the presence of Yazidi women suggesting that most of the 
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women and children are still alive.115 However, for those who survived, allegations of 
rape and sexual abuse are rampant. Reports include instances of rape and sexual abuse of 
Yazidi women and girls, forced marriages, sexual slavery, and torture.116 Among the few 
who have escaped there are often feelings of that “their ‘honor’ has been tarnished and 
fear that their standing in society will be diminished as a result.”117 
 
Figure 4: Yazidi Fleeing 
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C. Responsibility to Protect: Yazidi Crisis 
 1. Response of the International Community 
In response to the multifaceted crisis in northern Iraq, the international 
community responded with coercive humanitarian action in conjuncture with traditional 
humanitarian aid. President Obama authorized airstrikes to “protect the delivery of 
humanitarian aid for threatened Iraqis” and to stymie the assault of ISIS.118 The 
international community further responded with the influx of numerous humanitarian 
organizations and NGOs into refugee camps with the stated goal of assisting the targeted 
minority populations, to include the Yazidis.  
 With regard to the coercive humanitarian action, the international community 
responded to the targeting of the Yazidi people by forming a military coalition that 
seemed to align with the humanitarian trends of the1990s which “sought to influence the 
character and course of a developing conflict that was neither taking place on nor directly 
threatening national territory” but instead “intended to do good: looking after the victims 
of conflict, defending the weak and vulnerable against their oppressors.”119 The military 
coalition was composed of armed forces from the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Australian governments, supported by other members of the international community. 
The coalition airstrikes were used to assist the fleeing Yazidis people in the Sinjar 
Mountains in August 2014. Coalition aircraft dropped food, water, and portable shelter in 
response to the emergency. On August 14 the siege of Mount Sinjar was broken by 
coalition forces and thousands of Yazidi refugees escaped. However, despite the 
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seemingly benevolent humanitarian reasons for entering the conflict, the coalition has 
continued to engage militarily with ISIS in an ever expanding manner that extends 
beyond solely a humanitarian mission.  
Shortly after, the initial coercive humanitarianism in the form of airstrikes to halt 
the advance of ISIS towards the Sinjar Mountain, the United States began to conduct 
more frequent air attacks on ISIS targets in Iraq. On January 15, 2015, it was reported 
that more than 16,000 airstrikes have been conducted by the coalition120. Russian and 
American soldiers have also entered Syria, with the stated purpose of assisting the Assad 
regime and moderate rebel groups respectively, combat ISIS.121 With this increase, the 
coalition response is looking much less like the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s 
and more like the post 9/11 global war on terrorism as described by former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld “we’re looking at a sustained engagement that carries no 
deadline. We have no fixed rules about how to deploy our troops.”122 While the coercive 
actions of the international community escalate, traditional humanitarian work continues 
to respond to the Yazidi crisis. 
In the aftermath of the coalition response, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) is coordinating a United Nations response in Syria to assist the 
Yazidi people. The joint United Nations mission included efforts by the UNHCR, the 
World Food Programme and UNICEF. Additional efforts including included an airlift of 
2000 tents and 5000 mattresses. The UNHCR has also provided plastic sheets, blankets, 
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hygiene kits, ready to eat food, high energy biscuits, children’s summer clothes and soap, 
and other household items.123  The United Nations led response has also been 
supplemented by numerous NGOs and non-profit organizations.   
D. Responsibility to Rebuild  
One of the reasons why R2Pinitially was viewed as an improvement upon mere 
humanitarian intervention was because it carried with it a responsibility to not only 
 
Figure 5: Yazidi Movement Patterns 
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react but also separate responsibilities to both prevent and rebuild. While many would 
argue that the international community failed to prevent the atrocities being committed  
upon the Yazidi people, most would agree that the coalition response meets the 
requirement to react, although yet to be fulfilled is the responsibility to rebuild. It is in the 
responsibility to rebuild component of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine where I see 
the greatest potential in this developing norm. As was stated during a UN General 
Assembly debate on R2P in 2009 “The concept of responsibility to protect implies a 
process that not only includes prevention and response to violence, but also subsequent 
reconstruction to prevent reoccurrence of conflicts.”124 I will next look critically at two 
distinct methods of assistance that could fall under the responsibility to rebuild aspect of 
the Doctrine. Firstly, I will look at asylum grants as a means of assistance that could 
potentially fall under the responsibility to rebuild and make the argument that the Yazidi 
people fulfill the requisites for asylum, although this may not be the ideal solution. 
Secondly, I will critique humanitarian assistance being provided by the Christian Aid 
Mission in an effort to show that allowing humanitarian organizations unfettered access 
to a vulnerable population bears grave risks.  
E. Asylum 
 One possible response to the persecution of the Yazidi people which may fall 
under the responsibility to rebuild is the international community’s granting of asylum as 
a form of protection.  The concept of granting relief to victims of conflict through 
resettlement is one with significant historical precedent, although it has also become 
more controversial in the last few years with the European refugee crisis and the influx of 
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Central American refugees seeking entry into the United States. There is in fact an entire 
bureau within the United States Department of State devoted to providing humanitarian 
assistance and aid through repatriation, local integration and resettlement, known as the 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.125  
The most supported means of resettlement is through the granting of asylum in 
accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention and subsequent 1967 protocol. However, 
asylum according to the convention has a high threshold and there are strict requirements 
that must be met before an asylum seeker may be granted legal status within signatory 
states. I believe that the Yazidi people were targeted and thus clearly meet the threshold 
for religious persecution according to the 1951 Refugee Convention. There is likely a 
strong argument that many of the Yazidi people meet the 1951 Refugee Convention 
threshold for asylum on the basis of race or membership in a particular social group, 
however as of today there have been no asylum grants to Yazidis on the basis of religious 
persecution at the hands of ISIS.126 I will now go through the required components in 
order to display how these different avenues may be met.  
In its broadest terms asylum, in accordance with the refugee convention is met 
when a person is outside their country of birth and they seek protection from persecution 
on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular 
social group.127For a past persecution claim to be met, the asylum seeker must prove past 
persecution and must also prove that it was on the basis of one of the five protected areas 
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of the nexus requirement. Any survivor from the aforementioned executions would 
clearly meet this threshold, and there is a strong argument that all of the Yazidi people 
who fled from the persecution of ISIS would meet this requirement.  
 A successful claimant must prove not only that the persecution was on one of the 
protected grounds, such as on the basis of religion, but also that the persecution was 
harmful enough to warrant asylum. Persecution is generally linked to a strong violation of 
fundamental human rights norms. Persecution can take the form of physical abuse such as 
beatings.128 Persecution in the form of physical abuse can also be so extreme as to 
constitute torture. The human rights abuses outlined by the survivors of the executions 
and those of the captured women should all fulfill the requirement. 
 The court in Matter of Mogharrabi case reasoned that an applicant has an 
established well-founded fear if a reasonable person under his or her circumstances 
would fear persecution.129 The court reasoned that subjective components such as 
testimony and affidavits must suggest a well-founded fear.130 The court also reasoned 
that the well-founded fear must also be objectively reasonable as evident through sources 
such as newspapers, country reports and other similar cases.131 Thus, members of the 
Yazidi communities who escaped the attacks by ISIS but are still trapped within 
relatively close proximity could make an argument that they have a well-founded fear of 
persecution and thus could likely be granted asylum in many cases.  
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 However, due to the relatively small Yazidi population and the fact that it has 
remained in the same area of northern Iraq since its inception, as Avi Asher-Schapiro put 
it “It’s difficult to see how Yazidism could exist if they all left northern Iraq. The struggle 
is truly existential.” The vulnerability of the Yazidi religion and people as a whole 
suggests that asylum may not be the ideal solution to this tragedy and that other possible 
solutions must be explored. Thus, while providing asylum to members of the Yazidi 
community may be appropriate in many situations, the Yazidi culture as a whole may be 
further weakened by this remedy. Therefore, other interpretations of the responsibility to 
rebuild, under R2P must be examined; however, as I will show, not all efforts to assist the 
Yazidi people in the region have been appropriate.    
F. Humanitarian Aid: A Critique of the Christian Aid Mission 
The Christian Aid Mission is now serving over 35,000 people with much needed 
food, clothes, blankets, and heaters. The organization has also provided a mobile medical 
clinic which has helped many of the Yazidi people living in refugee camps. The 
coordination of the mobile medical clinic along with the indigenous ministry in Iraq 
“began visiting sick refugees with a large van equipped as a mobile medical clinic. Three 
volunteer doctors, five volunteer nurses, five church members, one psychologist and one 
dentist have served 2,500 refugees – about 50 to 80 per day” providing much needed 
medical assistance132. The mobile medical unit has also provided medical assistance for 
highly treatable medical conditions such as diabetes which would not be an immediate 
health risk if it were not for lack of access. One statement from the Christian Aid Mission 
shows the importance of the medical aid being delivered. A “refugee from the Yazidi 
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community was on the verge of death due to lack of medicine from diabetes…we 
provided insulin for him, which made his condition completely stable.”133 
 The Christian Aid Mission has recently been critiqued, on the ethicality of its 
policy of using aid as a means of converting Yazidi refugees in Kurdistan to Christianity. 
According to one report, the Christian Aid Mission “distribute[s] bibles and pamphlets 
containing information about Christianity” while they are delivering aid.134 The Christian 
Aid Mission publicly called the humanitarian mission in Kurdistan a “golden 
opportunity” for conversion.135 Missionaries had previously been unable to access the 
Yazidi people given their home in the mountainous region bordering Turkey. The 
Christian Aid Mission also stated that they have interpreted the attack by ISIS upon the 
Yazidi people as God bringing the Yazidi people to Christianity136. Sometimes members 
of the Yazidi community willingly convert in order to gain a better chance of obtaining a 
visa to a western country, creating a situation whereby Yazidis are converting to Islam to 
survive their encounters with ISIS and converting to Christianity to attempt to leave the 
region entirely. The number of Yazidi who have converted to Christianity as a result of 
the Christian Aid Mission is approximately 800 people.137  
 While Christian proselytization is nothing new, the exploitative manner in which 
it is being delivered to a highly vulnerable population should be critically analyzed. Many 
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of the Yazidi people who are being targeted by Christian aid organizations such as the 
Christian Aid Mission are experiencing severe trauma and instability. The Christian Aid 
Mission specifically mentions the story of one Yazidi boy name Shirkahn which is posted 
on their media outlets directly above a contribution link.138 The fifteen year old Yazidi 
boy who the Christian Aid Mission claims has “surrendered his life to the Lord” comes 
from an incredibly vulnerable position.139 Looking beyond the fact that he is a child of 
fifteen years old and not an adult he is also emerging from an incredibly traumatic 
experience. Shirkahn’s two sisters were kidnapped by ISIS and he does not know where 
they are or if they are even alive still. Additionally, Shirkahn’s father was paralyzed 
during the ISIS campaign that left Shirkahn fleeing for his life and without a home. When 
Christian Aid Mission workers met Shirkahn he was supporting his mother and father by 
shining shoes for 25 cents. According to the Christian Aid Mission, Shirkahn stated that 
he hadn’t eaten for four days.140 The Christian Aid Mission did not include any 
information about how they improved Shirkahn or his family’s position beyond his 
conversion to Christianity in the article titled “Islamic State Drives Yazidis to Christ.” 
This is one of the success stories of the mission and unfortunately this situation does not 
seem abnormal. In the piece “Dealing with War Trauma: a DO NO HARM Perspective” 
by Rupen Das, he explains that trauma recovery is a cathartic process and that “many 
communities have traditional methods of coping with trauma. But, with the breakdown of 
traditional societies and their social support structures, much knowledge of traditional 
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medicine and coping strategies…also get lost.”141 Not only is the Christian Aid Mission 
contributing to the breakdown of the Yazidi society through targeted conversion, but it 
may also be doing more harm than good by adding to the loss of traditional coping 
strategies.  
G. Recent Events  
 On March 17, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry recently made an 
announcement that the United States has officially determined that the persecution being 
committed upon minorities in Iraq to include the Yazidi people qualify as genocide. 
Secretary Kerry stated that his “purpose here today is to assert in my judgement, (ISIS) is 
responsible for genocide against groups in areas under its control including Yazidis, 
Christians and Shiite Muslims.”142  
 This conservative controlled House of Representatives passed a resolution which 
called the actions taken by ISIS against Christian groups in Syria and Iraq “genocide.” 
While the motivation seemed primarily geared towards defending Christian minorities the 
non-binding measure also included other ethnic and religious minorities such as the 
Yazidis. The measure was backed 393  to 0.  The resolution likely played a role in the 
State Department helmed by Kerry to make this official designation, the first official 
designation of genocide to occur since the term was used by the State Department in 
2004 with regard to the genocide in Darfur.  
 A member of the Yazidi community who has been working to help evacuate 
Yazidis from ISIS in rehabilitation efforts in Germany stated that “I am very happy to 
                                                 
 
141 Das, Rupen, Dealing with War Trauma: a DO NO HARM Perspective. Options for Aid in Conflict: 
Lessons from Field Experience (Mary B. Anderson, Editor) pg. 62.  
142 Kerry, John, ISIS responsible for Genocide, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/17/politics/us-iraq-
syria-genocide/index.html 
72 
 
heat that (the U.S.) will recognize the genocide of Yezidi and Christian minorities. This is 
an important step to stop the suffering of the persecuted people under the control of the 
extremist Islamic groups, especially ISIS. And this is also important for my community 
to trust the international community again, because we were left in the hands of Islamic 
State.”143  
 The declaration of ISIS committing genocide is unlikely to directly change the 
actions taken by the Obama administration because as the New York Times stated “The 
United States is already leading a coalition that is fighting the militants, and American 
aircraft have been bombing Islamic State leaders and fighters, its oil smuggling 
operations and even warehouses where the groups has stockpiled millions of dollars in 
cash.”144  
 While some would argue that the response by the United States is already 
fulfilling the requirements imposed upon them by recognizing the designation of the 
violence as genocide, under the genocide convention. I would also use this as an example 
as to why R2P should be further solidified. In this situation the designation of genocide 
does not require further assistance to be provided to the Yazidi people, however as 
genocide is one of the criteria under R2P, additional protections maybe required under 
this other system of international law.  
 In conclusion, it is evident that the Yazidi people are in an incredibly vulnerable 
position given their systemic persecution at the hands of the extremist organization 
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known as ISIS. The response from the international community appears to fall directly 
within R2P, and specifically under the second pillar given Baghdad’s approval of the 
coalition response. However, the humanitarian response has been muddied at best and 
harmful at worst. Meanwhile, most of the captured Yazidi women and children are still 
being held captive by extremists and the vulnerable escapees are being aggressively 
targeted for religious conversion while the United States government, pursues ISIS 
militarily now that they have procured their legal justification for re-entering the conflict 
under the guise of assisting the Yazidi people. This human rights disaster must not be 
allowed to continue and the international community must not sit idly by while world 
powers use vulnerable communities to justify military campaigns only to promptly ignore 
the communities once they have secured their moral coverage. The Yazidi people are 
trapped between extremists who wish to kill and enslave them, Kurdish political actors 
who desire their resources, members of the International community who wish to use 
them to justify their military campaigns, proselytizers who wish to convert them in their 
moment of vulnerability with even the greatest hope in many of their eyes, asylum in 
another country, holding consequences for the continuation of a small and ancient 
culture. I argue that while R2Phas been enacted it has not been fulfilled and the 
international community has a responsibility to help the Yazidi people rebuild their lives 
and new interpretations of the responsibility to rebuild must be considered.  
 Having discussed the historical persecution of the Yazidi, the current persecution 
of the Yazidi, the international community’s response, the potential of the responsibility 
to rebuild, the applicability of asylum as a remedy,  a critique of the humanitarian 
response, and recent events, I will next offer my assessments and recommendations as to 
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how R2P could be better used to both assist the Yazidi people and set an improved 
precedent for assisting targeting peoples in the future.  
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CHAPTER V 
ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. The Potential of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine to Assist the Yazidi  
With regard to the precarious and vulnerable position of the Yazidi people, I am 
of the opinion that the United States-led coalition in northern Iraq consisting of airstrikes 
and humanitarian assistance, falls under the second pillar of the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine. This coalition reaction with Iraqi government approval meets the responsibility 
to react component, although while it does not set a good precedent for escalation of 
reactions before resulting to military force, in this situation, perhaps more so than the 
Libyan intervention of 2011 swift military action was appropriate because by the time the 
airstrikes were initiated hundreds of Yazidis had already been killed by members of ISIS. 
The responsibility to rebuild component is woefully lacking and the Yazidi people are 
suffering because of it. While traditional development may of much help to the Yazidi 
people, for reason discussed further, I have several suggestions that I believe could fall 
under the responsibility to rebuild, while setting a positive precedent for future 
implementation of R2P as a whole and hopefully ease the suffering of the Yazidi people.  
One piece that I believe is essential to the recovery and healing of the Yazidi 
people in Northern Iraq is the security of their land from either ISIS or others who would 
seek to exploit or displace them. In the meantime this could take the form of a military 
cordon by coalition forces set up close enough to respond to threats to the Yazidi villages. 
In the long term, a United Nations Peacekeeping force, despite their many flaws, would 
likely be the best course of action. One of the primary mandates of United Nations 
Peacekeeping is the protection of civilians from physical violence. Once the physical 
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security of the Yazidi people is established other methods of rebuilding can begin to take 
place.  
While the dumping of funds into local economies almost always has 
ramifications, I believe that some financial assistance will be required to allow for the 
rebuilding of the homes and basic infrastructure in the Yazidi villages that were 
overtaken by ISIS. In order to best avoid the concentration of power in village leaders I 
would like to see small grants for the purpose of rebuilding individual homes be 
distributed to the lowest familial level possible so that those who are able to return have 
the financial means necessary to start their lives again. This will also necessitate health 
focused humanitarian assistance.  
Allowing a carefully selected and limited number of non-governmental 
organizations who specialize in medical assistance and mental health and trauma 
counseling to offer their services in several Yazidis villages would allow those who wish 
for assistance to have access at their will. Organizations that are attempting to use limited 
medical assistance as a cover for religious conversion, such as the Christian Aid Mission 
should not be allowed to access the Yazidi people, and if this is not possible then at the 
very least not be given any funding. I believe that these suggestions for rebuilding under 
the responsibility to rebuild portion of R2P are an obligation that the international 
community owes the Yazidi people, initiated with the first airstrikes in the region under 
the second pillar of the Doctrine. While my recommendations are fairly limited I will 
next discuss why the international community shouldn’t attempt to rebuild the Yazidi 
people in the traditional large scale development sense. 
77 
 
B. Development Risks Associated with Attempting to Rebuild Under the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
1. Ulterior Motives  
James Ferguson, author of the Anti-Politics Machine, offers a highly critical view 
of traditional large scale western model development practices and I believe that several 
of his arguments are applicable to why the responsibility to rebuild may not actually 
benefit the recipients. His critiques offer insight into why attempts at rebuilding under 
R2Pin the traditional sense may cause more harm than good.  Mr. Ferguson argues that 
the assumption that development agencies and projects are politically neutral is 
fundamentally incorrect given the conflict of interests, and political and economic 
motivators behind state actions. Secondly, the Mr. Ferguson argues that development 
projects have a cleansing effect upon politically motivated actions, thus the development 
industry becomes the machine for accomplishing political goals in an obfuscated manner, 
often with the development workers themselves unable to decipher the political results or 
possible motivations.  Mr. Ferguson has also called for the de-politicization of the 
development industry as a whole, although Ferguson avoids making generalized 
prescriptions.  
While many would see the actions of the World Bank as non-political, they are in fact 
applying a very top down modernization based development theory along with other 
Washington D.C. based institutions, mere blocks away from the seat of the United States 
government. Interventions in the name of development often draw from “a small and 
interlocking pool of personnel.”145 This relatively small pool of typically western 
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“experts” are sent to introduced standardized development models that are drawn from 
and also reinforce the knowledge apparatus discussed by Escobar, which is then used to 
influence the Third World. Therefore, the powerful are creating knowledge within 
limited parameters and applying this knowledge through their own institutions. This is 
evident through the homogenization of development reports on Lesotho which “look as 
though they would work nearly as well with the word ‘Nepal’ systematically substituted 
for ‘Lesotho.’”146 This homogenization becomes more nefarious when the instrumental 
effects of development discourse are analyzed after they are implemented.  
Ferguson states that when the failure to achieve the stated goals of a project is the 
widely accepted norm and there is little evidence of particularly poor planning or 
execution, that one must consider the political effects that are manifested alongside the 
failure to improve the quality of life of the intended targets of the development 
scheme.147 Ferguson is insinuating that perhaps the reason why development projects, 
which fail time after time, are repeatedly funded is because the desired end goal of the 
project actually lies within the instrumental effects. The term “instrumental effects” is 
defined by Ferguson as both “the institutional effect of expanding bureaucratic state 
power… [and the] ideological effect of depoliticizing both poverty and the state.”148 
Thus, the instrumental effects become the arm of the anti-politics machine, through 
expanding state power in a facially de-political manner. Ferguson suggests that if the 
“expansion and entrenchment of state power [is]…the principal effect…then the promise 
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of agricultural transformation appears simply as a point of entry for an intervention.”149 
Here Ferguson goes farther and suggests that the named development goals are little 
more than a means of accessing a country with the intent of implementing what are 
clearly political goals. The expansion of de-politicized state power alongside the repeated 
failure of development projects is particularly evident through the coalescence of 
governmentality in Lesotho.  
 2. Ramifications: Governmentality  
 One critique of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrines responsibility to rebuild is 
a critique that mirrors the ramifications of traditional large scale development. 
Governmentality is a term created by the philosopher Michel Foucault used to describe 
the processes in which governments attempt to manipulate their citizen base to better fit 
with government policies and also the means through which citizens are governed. In 
“The Anti-Politics Machine” Ferguson elucidates the inherent connections between large 
scale development projects and the expansion of governmentality. Ferguson explains that 
this connection is natural “because ‘development’ agencies operate on a national basis, 
and… work through existing governments and not against them” and goes on to say that 
development agencies are not prepared to accept representations of governments, which 
they view as the primary tool for planning and implementing “economic and social 
policy”, as anything besides a “neutral tool of enlightened policy”150. Ferguson goes on 
to show that this narrow view can have severe and unintended ramifications for the 
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targets of development projects. In his book, Ferguson uses a development project in 
Lesotho to highlight his critique of development practices.  
Development projects in Lesotho, while generally failing to improve the quality 
of life of the people, consequently strengthened the governmentality of the state through 
the creation of a road, the increased availability of government services, and the 
facilitation of direct military control, all of which could happen to the Yazidi people if 
traditional development projects are used to rebuild in the Yazidi territory, an area 
historically isolated. While the costly road building of the Thaba-Tseka development 
project did not improve the well-being of the population, it did allow for easier 
governance by allowing the government greater access to a mountainous region. The 
original goal of the construction of a road between the capital and the Thaba-Tseka 
region was to “bring about ‘decentralization’ or more ‘popular participation.’”151 In this 
goal the project failed, however according to Ferguson the road “was instrumental 
in…giving the Government of Lesotho a much stronger presence in the area than it had 
ever had before.”152 While failing to bring about the intended results, the development of 
this road did allow for easier governance of the Thaba-Tseka region by the national 
government, illustrating governmentality.  
 While the perceived well-being of the people actually declined after the 
implementation of the Thaba-Tseka development project, the project did have the result 
of bringing a host of government services into the region. The construction of a project 
center and the action of making the center the capital of a new district resulted in the 
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creation of a Post Office, a police station, an immigration control office, the ministry of 
the interior, and a new prison. These government services all had the effect of 
strengthening the government’s control over the bodies of its citizens, embodying 
Foucault’s idea of “biopower”.  Ferguson makes the argument that the creation of many 
of these seemingly benign government institutions, created with project resources, had 
the effect of fulfilling the “desire of the Government to gain political control of the 
opposition strongholds in the mountains.”153 The creation of new government services in 
the region in an effort to increase political control illustrates the idea of governmentality.  
 Though the development projects in the Thaba-Tseka region are seen as failing to 
accomplish their intended results they did facilitate later direct military control in the 
region. The newly created district capital in Thaba-Tseka not only brought government 
services to the region but also military personnel. The district capital eventually housed a 
central base of Lesotho’s army known as the “Para-Military Unit” and large numbers of 
armed soldiers whose brown uniforms were later seen frequently throughout the 
region. 154 The Thaba-Tseka development projects resulted in the increased militarization 
of the Thaba-Tseka region, allowing for greater governmental control, illustrating the 
idea of governmentality.  
 While the development projects in Lesotho failed to ameliorate the lives of the 
impoverished they did succeed in expanding state power, as evident by the increased 
governmentality in the Thaba-Tseka region, which took the form of a new road, new 
government services, and a military base. This likely side effect of increased state power 
                                                 
153 Id. at 253 
 
154 Id. at 253 
82 
 
and governmentality is one of many reasons why rebuilding the Yazidi people through 
traditional development models must be very critically assessed before any actions to 
rebuild are taken under R2P. However, despite these risks, I still believe that the limited 
actions I suggested earlier would ameliorate the situation of the Yazidi people hopefully 
few ramifications from any rebuilding assistance offered.   
C. Conclusion  
In conclusion, I am arguing on behalf of reinvigorating the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine for both the potential that I see in the positive aspects of the Doctrine 
and for fear of what consequences a reversion to humanitarian intervention would hold 
for global security. I see a great deal of potential within the Doctrine within the 
obligations outside of the obligation to react. The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, 
despite being imperfect is a good foundation to improve upon, given the wide popularity 
it received in the United Nations during its introduction. Another reason why I believe 
that the Doctrine is worth preserving is that I fear the ramifications of allowing R2P to 
degrade. I believe the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is a movement in the right 
direction away from the “right to intervene” mentality that existed before the emergence 
of the Doctrine.  Concerning a solution, I believe that the ideal solution for both victims 
of the four crimes and for global stability lies within the standardization of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.  
I see a great deal of potential within the non-reaction focused obligations included 
within the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. I see the equal importance that is placed 
upon the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild, as with the 
responsibility to react as very hopeful. Even if the most interventionist voices within the 
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international community are pushing for the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine in order to afford themselves another tool for regime change, by accepting R2P 
as this tool they are bringing with them these other responsibilities that I believe members 
of the international community who are dissatisfied with the more belligerent members, 
such as the United States with regard to Libya, may have a position from which to 
demand action or remedy. So long as the nation or group of nations who are given 
authority to intervene by the United Nations Security Council are invoking R2P, nation 
states that neighbor host nations should have the ability to demand that the intervener 
fulfill its equally weighted duty of rebuilding in the aftermath of the acting. For example, 
concerning the degraded condition of Libya given the regime change brought about by 
NATO involvement in 2011, neighboring countries should impress upon the United 
Nations that NATO or NATO allies have a responsibility to rebuild and not allow the 
country to disintegrate into a failed state, and if not neighboring countries than perhaps 
bodies within the United Nations. While, as I discussed before, there are some risks 
associated with the responsibility to rebuild, however dissatisfaction with the dropping of 
two of the obligations from R2P should be vocalized to undermine any future arguments 
against the obligation to prevent or rebuild grounded in state practice.  
While this thesis did not focus on the responsibility to prevent obligation within 
the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, given it was too late to be of much use in the 
Yazidi crisis, it is an area that deserves future analysis. Ideally, if a nation is complying 
with the intent of R2P then they have already taken an equal amount of action in the form 
of prevention before any direct action is taken. I believe that regional entities taking a 
more proactive and aware role when potential conflicts are boiling up could allow for 
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many instances of extreme violence to be prevented through nonmilitary conflict 
resolution based plans. 
There are strong voices within the international community who wish to continue 
to build upon R2P and to improve upon it, and in this I see even greater potential to fine 
tune the Doctrine and resolve its shortcomings. As discussed earlier some nation states 
such as Brazil, have argued for clearer methods of monitoring reviewing action taken. I 
believe that significant progress in this particular area of R2P could allow for one of the 
greatest downfalls or shortcomings of the Doctrine to be addressed; that of the possibility 
of continued conflict merging from the humanitarian based action. The United Nations 
Security Council should or appointed neutral investigators should regularly assess any 
action being taken under R2P with a focus on misuse for political gains. If any abuses are 
discovered, such as the pursuance of political goals or unauthorized regime change in the 
react phase, or harmful consequences or attempts to profit economically during the 
rebuilding phase, then the member states leading the United Nations Security Council or 
State approved mission should be replaced by another capable member state or states. 
While unlikely I would also like to see a restriction placed upon future R2P based action 
for a period of several years. 
 Another condition that I would like to see added to R2P, as I discussed earlier 
would be a conflict of interest clause. Member states who played a role in a recent regime 
change, such as the United States in Iraq regarding the Yazidi situation, or have a 
colonial history for example, should not be authorized to take action within a state with 
whom they share this history with. I would like to see any actions being taken by 
members outside the region of influence of the host state so as to ensure the greatest level 
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of neutrality possible. While, this is certainly an idealistic position, a call for a reduction 
of conflicts of interests built upon the foundation of R2Pcould improve some of the most 
significant failures of R2P in its current status, such as its use as a tool for a government 
to overthrow one regime and then rebuild or back the entities within the state who they 
wish to succeed. Alternatively, if nations authorized to intervene during the react phase 
still had the obligation to rebuild but instead of emplacing their own development 
organization were instead required to fund the bill while another regionally distinct 
member state or group of states were to be charged with carrying out the rebuilding I 
believe this would serve as a deterrent for the pattern of regime change to rebuild, which 
I believe the Yazidi situation falls under.  While I see many possible aspects and potential 
within R2P, I also see severe consequences for global security if R2P is allowed to die as 
a piece of public international law.   
 Despite the many flaws of the current state of R2P and with the current state of 
the development industry as a whole, as I argued earlier I am of the position that the 
Doctrine is a movement in the right direction away from the even more controversial 
humanitarian intervention. There are many historical examples of military intervention in 
the name of humanitarian reasons leading to harmful and exploitative outcomes, with 
R2P there are necessary precursors before humanitarian action can be taken, and steady 
evolution away from unilateral military action is benefit from my point of view.  
 Examples of humanitarian intervention gone afoul include the intervention in 
Somalia in 1992, wherein the country is still trying to deal with security issues, violent 
extremist groups, and boundary issues with constituent states. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Origination’s bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in between March and June 
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1999 which resulted in the death of approximately 500civilians and the destruction of 
critical infrastructure such as bridges, power plants, and public buildings, and severe 
harm to the post-soviet relationship between the Russia and NATO members. The events 
in Libya as discussed, while taken under the name of the R2P, in practice ignored many 
of the potentially beneficial aspects of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and filtered 
down into a response that more resembled military based humanitarian Interventions. 
This intervention in Libya by the United States led coalition set a poor precedent for R2P, 
by effectively ignoring all of the facets which improved upon humanitarian intervention.  
 Humanitarian intervention is a piece within the R2P that if done correctly should 
go through many other actions first, which will hopefully prevent the need for military 
based humanitarian intervention. The first duty under the R2Pis the responsibility to 
prevent and if R2Pis allowed to continue to falter then this important facet will no longer 
be required before military action in the name of humanitarianism is taken. While in 
practice, there will almost always be non-militaristic action taken through an escalation 
of force, however not having a source of public international law requiring this may 
weaken the importance or value of prevention and alternate dispute resolution techniques 
rather than force. The benefit of explicitly stating that military action will only be taken 
as a last resort even within the responsibility to act portion of R2P is greatly undervalued 
in my opinion. A loss of these formalized pre-requisites prior to taking military action in 
the name of humanitarianism is effectively a reversion back towards the loose 
humanitarian intervention that became so unpopular with the United States led invasion 
of Iraq under the Bush regime. 
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 Any movement away from unilateral military action in the name of 
humanitarianism in my opinion is strength. The ability for any global power to infringe 
upon the sovereignty of another without the approval of the United Nations Security 
Council is a risk for global stability. By devolving back towards humanitarian 
intervention through the loss of R2P might reinvigorate voices calling for the right to 
unilateral intervention. While there is the pre-requisite for Security Council dysfunction 
for this to be the case, given the polarization of the current United Nations Security 
Council, any improvement to this is unlikely in the near future.  This would allow for 
future interventions of a similar fashion to the United States’ effectively unilateral 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
stated that the Iraq war was illegal because the Iraq invasion did not meet the 
requirements under the United Nations Charter and the Security Council did not approve. 
Despite this, the United States acted without retaliation given its military power and 
influence. In a similar fashion the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 was not prevented by 
the United Nations. The method with which the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine was 
employed in the Libyan Intervention and the coalition response to the Yazidi crisis made 
future R2P actions which focus only on military action more likely, and given the still 
emerging status of the Doctrine under customary international law, more justifiable. 
Unfortunately the Yazidi situation has reinforced the unfavorable precedent set by 
the United States led coalition in the 2011 Libyan Intervention, with regard to the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. The response largely ignored the responsibility to 
prevent and then only reacted well after genocide was occurring at the hands of ISIS. The 
reaction, while in this scenario not entirely inappropriate elevated straight to the level of 
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military focused humanitarian intervention, reinforcing the heavy handed reaction in 
Libyan and painting R2P as simply humanitarian intervention redecorated in more 
favorable language. The response has also been severely lacking in appropriate rebuilding 
efforts. The United States led coalition response to the Yazidi crises also likely fulfilled 
most people’s greatest fears about the Doctrine being used as a tool to authorize perpetual 
warfare and regime change. While in Libya R2P was used to justify overthrowing 
Gaddafi, in Iraq the Yazidi people were used to grant legitimacy to an indefinite war 
against ISIS.  However, I strongly believe that the best course of action is not to simply 
let the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine die, but instead attempt to standardize the 
Doctrine and demand the utilization of all of the obligations of the Doctrine be utilized in 
alignment with the intent of the mass of supporters in 2005.  
 I am in favor of standardizing the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, the most 
likely form that this speculative standardization could take would be the form of a United 
Nations Convention; the same form that many developments in public ,international law 
have taken since the formation of the United Nations. As I have argued, I believe that the 
benefits of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine outweigh the negatives of not having 
such a Doctrine or allowing for a return to solely humanitarian intervention as it was in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. The benefits of standardizing the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine such as in the form of an international convention would likely include more 
uniform and comprehensive application of the Doctrine, a more solid foundation upon 
from which other aspirational principles may build on, and importantly it may, depending 
on the language applied, allow for the possible enforcement against those who do not 
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adhere to the requirements. Standardization could also allow for the inclusion of all of the 
obligations of R2P through customary international law.  
 The pathway for the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine to become a binding treaty 
would be long and arduous; although given the successive support of multiple United 
Nations Secretary Generals I do not believe that it is impossible. Another positive sign 
for R2P for one advocating for its standardization is the already impressive level of 
acceptance that it currently holds among member states of the general assembly, evident 
by the endorsement at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This is of course tempered by the disfavor that 
befell the emerging Doctrine in the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan debacle.  
 One benefit of a more standardized Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, such as in 
the form of a treaty or convention would be that global super powers or veto holding 
members of the United Nations Security council would find it harder to only act upon one 
aspect or pillar of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine as I argue was the case in Libya, 
where the United States led coalition took action that lacked sufficient prevention and 
possibly rebuilding efforts. If the United States had signed a treaty requiring the order of 
operations concerning the obligations of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine I believe 
that they would have had to reasonably attempt more preventative steps prior to the use 
of force as well as tried more measures other than simply military force taking the form 
of regime change. This standardization would also likely help to disallow the invocation 
of R2P as a moral cover the Doctrine from being misused for political objectives.  
Thus, I believe that despite its many flaws, the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
should be preserved and not left to deteriorate as a body of public international law. The 
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positive aspects of the Doctrine should be built upon and a reversion to humanitarian 
intervention should be avoided at all costs. Despite its imperfections, R2P should be 
improved upon, given the wide popularity it received in the United Nations during its 
introduction and the potential within its non-reactionary obligations. To counteract these 
dangers, I believe that the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine should be standardized for 
the benefit of both the victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, such as the Yazidi people, and for general global stability. For these 
reasons I believe that the voices who wish to improve upon the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine should be supported.  
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